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 This	 paper	 analyzes	 the	 current	 debate	 over	 encryption	 policy.	 Through	 careful	evaluation	of	possible	solutions	to	‘going	dark’	as	well	has	weighting	the	costs	and	benefits	of	each	solution,	we	found	exceptional	access	to	information	more	harmful	than	helpful.	Today,	there	seems	to	be	no	singular	leading	answer	to	the	going	dark	problem.	Exceptional	access	 to	data	and	communications	 is	a	simple	solution	 for	a	simple	problem,	however	going	dark	 is	very	 complex,	 and	 requires	a	multifaceted	and	refined	solutions.	Widespread	encryption	forces	those	listening—whether	it	is	the	 NSA,	 FBI,	 foreign	 governments,	 criminals	 or	 terrorist—to	 be	 much	 more	targeted.	 As	 for	 the	 going	 dark	metaphor,	 it	 seems	 as	 though	we	 are	 not	 entirely	“going	dark”,	and	yet	we	are	not	completely	bright	either.	There	are	dark	and	bright	spots	 coming	and	going	across	 the	 technological	 landscape	battling	 in	a	perpetual	technological	arms	race.	The	findings	of	this	paper,	ultimately	determine	there	to	be	no	 policy	 that	 doesn’t	 come	without	 some	 cost.	 That	 said,	 there	 are	 a	 number	 of	ways	in	which	law	enforcement	can	track	criminals	and	terrorist	without	weakening	encryption,	which	we	determine	to	be	the	best	direction	 in	any	win	lose	situation.	Nevertheless,	 as	 technology	 continues	 to	 evolve	 and	 encryption	 capabilities	continue	to	become	a	part	of	everyday	life	for	Americans	this	debate	will	only	grow	larger,	and	we,	as	a	society,	must	determine	how	to	make	the	best	of	it.						
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Introduction 		 What	 if	 I	 told	you:	 anyone	could	 look	at	your	 text	messages.	Anyone	could	read	your	emails	and	listen	to	your	phone	calls.	They	can	see	where	you	are,	when	you	are	and	with	whom	your	 calls	 are	made.	 These	are	 the	 fears	and	concerns	of	many	 privacy	 experts	 today.	 	However,	 advances	 in	 technology	have	 also	made	 it	increasingly	easy	to	hide	behind	digital	fortresses.	Strong	encryption	is	everywhere,	and	 it	 seems	 it	 is	 here	 to	 stay.	 United	 States	 legislators	 and	 law	 enforcement	agencies	 fear	 strong	 encryption	 technology	made	 readily	 available	 to	 any	 and	 all	individuals	 threatens	 our	 national	 security.	 The	 tech	 industry	 disparages	 these	concerns,	arguing	that	government	control	violates	the	privacy	of	civilians.	Although	encryption	 technology	 has	 been	 around	 for	 half	 a	 century,	 encryption	 has	 gained	notoriety	in	the	past	decade,	as	it	became	a	fundamental	part	of	our	everyday	lives.	Every	 time	 we	 log	 into	 our	 email,	 Facebook,	 or	 Internet	 banking,	 all	 of	 our	information	is	protected	using	encryption	code.		It	protects	our	data	from	malicious	hackers,	 spies,	 online	 criminals,	 and	 government	 surveillance.	 Moreover,	 the	security	 encryption	 delivers	 goes	 far	 beyond	 the	 individual	 level.	 Large	 databases	used	 by	 most	 companies	 and	 government	 agencies	 can	 be	 treasure	 troves	 of	sensitive	 information.	They	can	contain	 customers’	personal	data	 such	as	hospital	health	 records,	 intellectual	property,	 or	 even	 sensitive	military	 information.	Many	tech	companies	abide	by	certain	protocols	and	policies	for	the	prevention	of	theft	or	corporate	espionage	(such	as	Google,	Apple,	Amazon,	Drop	Box,	Twitter	and	many	more).		
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	 Law	enforcement	officials	raise	strong	claims	concerning	strong	encryption	and	 its	 consequences.	 The	 FBI,	 the	 most	 vocal	 government	 agency,	 has	 been	concerned	 there	 is	 a	 widening	 gap	 between	 law	 enforcement’s	 legal	 privilege	 to	intercept	 electronic	 communications	 and	 its	 practical	 ability	 to	 actually	 intercept	those	 communications.	 The	 Fourth	 Amendment	 of	 the	 United	 States	 Constitution	authorizes	 reasonable	 searches	 and	 seizures,	providing	 law	 enforcement	 agencies	access	to	places	where	criminals	hide	evidence.	Pursuant	to	judicial	warrants	these	rights	 are	 conducted	 upon	 a	 neutral	 judge’s	 finding	 of	 probable	 cause.	 However,	“Technology	 has	 become	 a	 tool	 of	 choice	 for	 some	 very	 dangerous	 people.	 And,	unfortunately,	 the	 law	has	 not	 kept	 pace	with	 technology	 and	 this	 disconnect	 has	created	 the	 significant	 public	 safety	 problem	 we	 have	 long	 described	 as	 “going	dark”,	 said	 FBI	 director	 James	 Comey.1	This	 ominous	 sounding	 term	 means	 that	even	 though	 law	 enforcement	 has	 the	 legal	 authority	 to	 intercept	 and	 access	communications	 and	 information	 pursuant	 to	 court	 orders	 (according	 to	 the	 4th	amendment)	“they	often	lack	the	technical	ability	to	carry	out	those	orders	because	of	 a	 fundamental	 shift	 in	 communications	 services	 and	 technologies,	 allowing	 the	criminals	to	slip	into	the	dark”.2			 In	 recent	 years,	 Apple	 and	 Google	 have	 created	 very	 strong	 encryption	 on	their	 consumer	 products	 (iPhones	 and	 Androids)	 by	 default.	 This	 means	 that	millions	of	people,	across	the	globe,	are	sending	messages	with	extreme	protected	communication	software	that	they	never	chose	for	themselves.	It	was	gifted	to	them.																																																									1	Comey,	James.	The	Brookings	Institution.	Going	Dark:	Are	Technology,	Privacy,	and	
Public	Safety	on	a	Collision	Course?	Washington,	D.C.	October	16,	2014.	2	FBI.gov,	Going	Dark	Issue.	April	6,	2016.	
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Many	 government	 officials	 argue	 for	 encryption	 to	 be	 a	 choice,	 rather	 than	 a	requirement	 to	 own	 an	 iPhone	 or	 Android.	 Moreover,	 these	 tech	 conglomerates	didn’t	strongly	advertise	these	new	features.	Director	Comey	also	stated	“There	was	always	 a	 corner	 of	 the	 room	 that	was	 dark.	 Sophisticated	 actors	 could	 always	 get	access,	either	for	devices	or	for	live	comms,	to	encryption.	What	has	happen	just	in	the	three	years	that	I	have	been	Director,	post-Snowden,	is	that	that	dark	corner	of	the	 room—especially	 through	 default	 encryption	 on	 devices—that	 shadow	 is	spreading	 through	more	 and	more	 of	 the	 room.”3	However,	 the	 going	 dark	 issue	affects	 a	 number	 of	 law	 enforcement	 and	 national	 security	 agencies,	 and	 the	encryption	debate	 is	not	viewed	the	same	way	across	governmental	organizations	or	 among	 the	 individuals	 within	 these	 organizations.	 Encryption	 raising	 complex	question	for	privacy,	security,	surveillance,	national	security,	terrorism,	and	well	as	economic,	 political,	 and	 social	 concerns.	 The	 needs	 and	 resources	 of	 government	organizations	differ,	as	do	their	 jurisdictional	domains.	For	 instance,	 the	resources	available	 to	 the	FBI	 for	defeating	encryption	may	be	 fewer	than	those	available	 to	the	 NSA.	 State	 and	 local	 authorities	 have	 access	 to	 fewer	 resources	 than	 law	enforcement	operating	at	the	federal	level.	However,	while	the	degree	of	trepidation	and	 operational	 value	 may	 differ	 among	 government	 agencies,	 there	 is	 a	 general	sense	by	those	within	both	the	intelligence	and	law	enforcement	communities	that	they	would	all	benefit	if	encryption	did	not	present	a	barrier	to	investigations.	The	purpose	of	this	discourse	is	to	analyze	the	leading	arguments	from	both	technology	science	 expert	 and	 government	 officials.	 The	 findings	 of	 this	 paper	 illustrate	 the																																																									3	Comey,	James.	“The	FBI’s	Approach	to	the	Cyber	Threat”,	Symantec	Government	Symposium:	Washington,	D.C.	August	30,	2016.	
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inherent	problems	in	government-mandated	access	to	data	and	communications,	as	well	as	provide	 insight	 in	 to	alternative	outlets	 for	 lawful	government	surveillance	that	does	not	weak	encryption	systems.			
Chapter	1:	Background	of	Today’s	Debate	on	Going	Dark		
The	San	Bernardino	Terrorist	Attack	
		 San	 Bernardino—a	 terrorist	 attack	 that	 killed	 14	 civilians—subsequently	provoked	a	public	battle	between	the	Federal	Bureau	of	Investigation	of	the	United	States	and	the	world’s	largest	information	technology	company4,	Apple	Inc.		 On	December	 2,	 2015,	 Syed	Rizwan	 Farook	murdered	14	people	 in	 a	mass	shooting	 and	 attempted	 bombing.	 During	 the	 investigation,	 the	 FBI	 recovered	Farook’s	 phone,	 but	 could	 not	 access	 its	 contents	 due	 to	 Apple’s	 encryption	software.	 The	 phone	 was	 protected	 by	 a	 four-digit	 passcode	 and	 a	 self-destruct	feature	 set	 to	 erase	 the	 phone’s	 Random-Access	Memory	 after	10	 failed	 attempts.	The	FBI,	unable	to	unlock	the	phone,	asked	Apple	to	create	new	software	to	bypass	the	phone’s	security	system.	Apple	refused.5	As	a	result,	the	FBI	filed	a	suit	against	Apple	for	not	complying	with	their	search	warrant.	A	public	heated	debate	ensued.	However,	the	case	never	made	it	to	trial	because	the	FBI	was	eventually	able	to	open																																																									4	Largest	by	revenue	5	Grossman,	Lev.	TIME.	Inside	Apple	CEO	Tim	Cook’s	Fight	with	the	FBI.	Calif.	March	17,	2016.		
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the	 phone	 using	 an	 undisclosed	 third	 party	 technology	 company.	 The	 intensive	media	 coverage	 accelerated	 the	 story	 to	 mainstream	 knowledge,	 however,	 less	recognized	is	the	impact	encryption	has	on	our	society.	Moreover,	San	Bernardino	is	not	an	isolated	incident,	but	rather,	a	glimpse	into	the	wider	debate	between	privacy	and	national	security.	The	propositions	posited	in	this	paper	weigh	theoretical	costs	and	 benefits	 between	 encryption	 and	 national	 security	 that	 may	 have	 drastic	impacts	 in	our	society.	Therefore,	 the	aim	of	 this	paper	 is	 to	evaluate,	critique	and	propose	leading	arguments	in	the	privacy-national	security	policy	debate.			 In	 February	 2016,	 the	 FBI	 obtained	 a	 court	 order	 issued	 by	 United	 States	Magistrate	Judge,	Sherri	Pym,	in	a	case	called	In	the	Matter	of	the	Search	of	an	Apple	
iPhone	 Seized	 During	 the	 Execution	 of	 a	 Search	 Warrant	 on	 a	 Black	 Lexus	 IS300,	
California	License	Plate	35KGD203.	This	legally	obtained	warrant	mandated	Apple	to	create	and	provide	the	requested	software.	The	order	was	issued	under	the	All	Writ	
Act	of	1789	 (which	 states	 that	U.S.	 federal	 courts	 have	 authority	 to	 issue	 all	writs	necessary	in	aid	of	their	jurisdiction).	In	doing	so,	the	FBI	was	not	only	taking	legal	action	against	Apple,	it	was	bringing	this	dispute	out	from	behind	closed	doors,	and	into	the	public.		 However,	FBI	Director	James	Comey	wanted	to	make	it	clear	that	the	FBI	isn’t	against	 encryption	 in	 general.	 He	 understands	 it	 value	 and,	 “I	 love	 strong	encryption.	It	protects	us	in	so	many	ways	from	bad	people.	It	helps	the	FBI	with	our	mission,	 which	 centers	 on	 protecting	 privacy	 and	 fighting	 hackers.” 6 	If	 both																																																									6	Comey,	James.	“Expectations	of	Privacy:	Balancing	Liberty	and	Security	and	Public	Safety	Center”,	Study	of	American	Democracy	Biennial	Conference,	Kenyon	College:	Gambier,	Ohio	April	6,	2016.	
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government	 and	 the	 public	 agree	 encryption	 is	 incredibly	 useful,	why	 did	 the	 FBI	appear	 to	 be	 attempting	 to	 weaken	 Apple’s	 software	 during	 the	 San	 Bernardino	investigation,	and	why	is	encryption	policy	still	so	heavily	debated?	At	the	climax	of	the	FBI-Apple	debate,	FBI	Director	 James	Comey	stated	 in	a	press	conference	that,	“we	 simply	want	 the	 chance,	with	a	 search	warrant,	 to	 try	 to	guess	 the	 terrorist's	passcode	 without	 the	 phone	 essentially	 self-destructing	 and	 without	 it	 taking	 a	decade	 to	 guess	 correctly.”7	Along	with	 the	 standard	 four-digit	 passcode	on	Apple	iPhones,	Farook	had	installed	an	additional	security	mechanism	with	a	self-destruct	feature	set	to	erase	the	phone’s	Random-Access	Memory	after	10	incorrect	entries.	After	threatening	to	file	a	suit	against	Apple	for	refusing	to	grant	them	access	to	the	phone,	the	FBI	received	strong	backlash	from	the	tech	community,	who	accused	the	FBI	 of	 trying	 to	 force	 Apple	 to	 weaken	 their	 encryption	 software.	 In	 response,	Director	Comey	stated	in	a	press	conference	that,	“[the	FBI	does	not]	want	to	break	anyone's	encryption	or	set	a	master	key	loose	on	the	land…[but]	maybe	the	phone	holds	the	clue	to	 finding	more	terrorists.	Maybe	 it	doesn’t.	But	[the	FBI]	can’t	 look	the	 survivors	 in	 the	 eye,	 or	 [them]	 selves	 in	 the	mirror,	 if	 [they]	 don’t	 follow	 this	lead.”(Comey,	“San	Bernardino”)	Despite	this	defense,	there	still	remained	a	number	of	barriers	to	forcing	Apple	to	grant	them	access	to	the	phone.			 The	first	barrier	to	this	forceful	request	was	the	fact	that	Apple’s	encryption	software	 was	 end-to-end,	 which	 means	 “the	 information	 is	 (in	 theory,	 and	 as	advertised)	 not	 capable	 of	 being	 read	 by	 anyone	who	 sees	 it	 traverse	 a	 network																																																									7	Comey,	James.	“FBI	Director	Comments	on	San	Bernardino	Matter”,	LawFare	Blog:	FBI	National	Press	Office,	February	21,	2016.			
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between	 the	 sender	 and	 the	 receiver,	 including	 an	 intermediary	 service	 provider,	such	as	Apple.	Similarly,	device	encryption	–	in	which	the	keys	exist	only	on	locked	devices	–	prevents	 the	 contents	 from	being	read	by	anyone	who	does	not	possess	the	keys”.8	Only	the	four-digit	passcode	known	by	the	phones	owner,	now	deceased,	could	unlock	the	information	inside.	Therefore,	the	FBI	needed	Apple	to	create	new	software	 to	 open	 the	 phone.	 As	 Director	 Comey	 had	 publicly	 explained,	 the	 new	software	would	 only	 be	 used	 to	 unlock	 Farook’s	 phone.	While	 Director	 Comey	 is	correct	that	he	is	not	explicitly	asking	Apple	to	build	a	master	key	system	into	their	software	for	all	devices	the	new	software	would	give	the	FBI	the	ability	to	break	into	any	device	 individually.	Apple	argued	 that	 compromising	 its	 security,	 even	 if	 only	once	is	akin	to	providing	a	backdoor	to	authorities	to	gain	access	to	any	other	Apple	device	thereafter.	In	an	attempt	to	explain	to	Apple	costumers	the	potential	dangers	of	the	FBI’s	request,	Cook	wrote	that	“[the	FBI]	would	have	the	power	to	reach	into	anyone’s	 device	 to	 capture	 their	 data.”9	However,	 the	 motivations	 for	 Apple’s	backlash	 are	 still	 up	 for	 debate,	 and	 there	 is	 some	 subjectivity	 in	 evaluating	 how	much	of	the	company’s	actions	were	to	protect	costumers	as	opposed	to	the	brand.	Nonetheless,	 Apple	 was	 strongly	 supported	 by	 other	 technology	 conglomerates	including	Google,	Facebook,	Twitter,	and	many	more,	despite	them	not	having	much	stake	in	the	San	Bernardino	case	specifically.			 A	counterpoint	to	both	Apple	and	the	FBI’s	arguments	in	the	dispute	is	that	rather	than	giving	some	kind	of	key	to	the	FBI,	it	would	seem	the	FBI	could	hand	the																																																									8	Blaze,	Matt.	“U.S.	House	of	Representatives	Committee	on	Energy	and	Commerce	Subcommittee	on	Oversight	and	Investigation	Hearing	on	“Deciphering	the	Debate	Over	Encryption,”	Washington	D.C.	April	19,	2016.		9	Cook,	Tim.	“Message	to	Our	Customers”,	Apple.com:	Accessed	December	2,	2016.	
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phone	to	Apple,	and	have	them	try	and	unlock	it	behind	closed	doors.	The	FBI	would	have	the	phone	unlocked,	and	Apple	would	have	control	of	the	software	and	could	therefore	 destroy	 it	 after.	However,	 there	 are	also	 some	 foreseeable	 objections	 to	this	resolution.	(1)	What	would	keep	the	FBI	from	returning	to	Apple	with	another	device,	and	what	are	the	parameters?	(2)	And	if	Apple	destroyed	the	software	there	created	 to	 open	 each	 phone	 afterwards,	 how	much	 time	 and	 resources	would	 the	company	waste	in	developing	and	destroying	software,	for	the	FBI?	(3)	How	would	this	 affect	 Apple’s	 brand	 financial	 interests?	 (4)	 There	 is	 always	 a	 possibility	 of	information	being	leaked.			 Similar	to	this	line	of	reasoning	are	arguments	found	in	a	document	from	the	U.S.	 Attorneys	 for	 the	 Central	 District	 of	 California	 Eileen	M.	 Decker,	 Chief	 of	 the	Cyber	and	 Intellectual	Property	Crimes	Section	Tracy	L.	Wilkison	and	Chief	of	 the	National	Security	Division	Patricia	A.	Donahue.10	In	this	letter	supporting	the	order	to	compel	Apple’s	help	in	unlocking	Farook’s	iPhone,	federal	prosecutors	claim	the	technology	company	was	playing	to	the	media	in	an	attempt	to	protect	its	brand.	It	reads:	 "Apple	and	its	amici	try	to	alarm	this	Court	with	issues	of	network	security,	encryption,	back	doors,	and	privacy,	invoking	larger	debates	before	Congress	and	 in	 the	 news	 media.	 That	 is	 a	 diversion.	 Apple	 desperately	 wants--desperately	needs--this	case	not	to	be	'about	one	isolated	iPhone”(2).	
																																																								10	Decker,	Eileen,	Patricia	Donahue,	Tracy	Wilkison.	“Government’s	Reply	In	Support	of	Motion	to	Compel	And	Opposition	to	Apple	Inc.’s	Motion	To	Vacate	Order”,	United	States	District	Court	For	the	Central	District	of	California,	March	22,	2016.	
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They	claim	that	work	required	to	comply	with	the	government’s	request	would	only	take	six	(out	of	100,000)	employees	two	weeks	time	to	complete.	Furthermore,	the	prosecutors	 claim	 the	 argument	 that	 weakening	 the	 security	 of	 one	 iPhone	 is	 a	slippery	slope	to	a	surveillance	state,	is	"not	only	false,	but	also	corrosive	of	the	very	institutions	that	are	best	able	to	safeguard	our	liberty	and	our	rights”(2).	They	claim	there	is	no	reason	to	think	that	the	code	Apple	writes	in	compliance	with	the	Order	will	ever	leave	Apple’s	possession.	“Nothing	in	the	Order	requires	Apple	to	provide	that	code	to	the	government	or	 to	explain	to	 the	government	how	it	works.”	They	also	 claim	 that	 Apple	 is	more	 than	 capable	 of	 protecting	 its	 code	 as	 it	 “currently	protects	(1)	 the	source	code	to	 iOS	and	other	core	Apple	software	and	(2)	Apple’s	electronic	signature	(Hanna	Decl.	Ex.	DD	at	62-64	(code	and	signature	are	“the	most	confidential	 trade	 secrets	 [Apple]	 has”)	 (24).	Therefore,	 their	 argument	 is,	 if	 they	can	 protect	 some	 code	 (of	 the	 upmost	 importance	 to	 their	 company)	 they	 can	protect	 any	 code.	 From	 Apple’s	 perspective,	 why	 would	 a	 company	 want	 to	 risk	having	more	sensitive	information	to	protect	if	they	don’t	have	to?		 Regardless	of	whether	Apple’s	actions	were/are	entirely	constitutional,	and	regardless	of	whether	their	actions	are	more	in	line	with	their	own	interests	than	in	protecting	 there	 customers,	 in	 the	 end,	 the	 FBI	 was	 able	 to	 solve	 their	 problem	without	 weakening	 an	 encryption	 systems.	 The	 San	 Bernardino	 terrorist	 attack	brought	 national	 attention	 to	 the	 privacy	 versus	 security	 debate.	 However,	 going	dark	effects	all	levels	of	law	enforcement.		
	 12	
	 In	continuing	this	discourse,	it	is	important	to	address	those	who	may	believe	this	 issue	 is	 too	 complex,	 or	 too	 heavily	 based	 on	 technology	 to	 be	 effectively	debated	in	congress,	or	by	the	public.	In	response,	let	us	take	a	deeper	look	into	both	technical	and	historical	background	of	encryption	technology.		
Technical	and	Historical	Background:	Encryption,	Methods,	and	Backdoors	
	
		 One	 rationalization	 for	 the	FBI/Apple	dispute’s	 rapid	escalation	between	 is	connected	 to	 the	negative	 connotation	associated	with	 the	 terms	 “gaining	access”;	and	 its	 derivative:	 “backdoor”.	 An	 exploration	 of	 backdoors	 history	 shows	 why	many	tech	experts	may	be	predisposed	to	reject	 the	FBI’s	demands.	Moreover,	 too	many	people	have	circulated	the	idea	that	this	issue	is	to	technologically	complex	to	be	debated	in	congress.	This	is	an	issue	of	weighing	costs	and	benefits.	In	order	to	do	so,	we	must	do	our	best	 to	 fully	understand	 the	extent	and	magnitude	of	 each.	However,	 to	 claim	 this	 policy	 question	 should	 be	 left	 to	 the	 tech	 companies	 and	experts	 alone	 is	 illegitimate.	 To	 help	 put	 that	 objection	 to	 rest,	 here	 is	 a	 brief	 on	everything	one	needs	to	know	about	encryption	from	a	technical	perspective.		 It	 is	 important	 to	 make	 the	 distinction,	 here,	 between	 access	 to	 Internet	networks	and	communication	devices	(e.g.	iPhones).	Encryption	is	used	in	both	and	thus	both	contribute	to	going	dark.	Thus,	the	government	has	wanted	access	to	both	fore	 decades,	 in	what	 has	 become	 known	 as	 the	 “crypto	wars”.	 This	 chapter	will	focus	 on	 encryption	 and	 mandated	 access	 in	 regards	 to	 information	 on	 devices	
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(iPhones/Android),	 even	 though	 themselves	 are	 connected	 through	 encrypted	Internet	networks.	We	will	explore	the	access	of	the	latter	in	chapter	3.	For	now,	lets	explore	 the	 history	 and	 technology	 of	 tradition	 encryption	 methods	 in	 order	 to	better	 understand	 how	 they	 can	 be	 decrypted,	 and	what	 the	 dangers	 of	 doing	 so	might	be.		 The	 story	 of	 backdoor	 keys	 begins	 in	 the	 1970s,	 when	 electronic	 cryptic	algorithms	 boomed	 with	 the	 spread	 of	 commercial	 and	 government	 computer	systems	 (it	 is	 important	 to	note	 the	NSA’s	 continuous	 involvement	and	 interest	 in	this	 technology).	As	Steve	Levy	explains	 in	“Crypto:	How	the	Code	Rebels	Beat	 the	Government—Saving	Privacy	 in	 the	Digital	Age”,	 the	National	Bureau	of	Standards	(NBS)	released	an	invitation	to	propose	a	candidate	for	the	protection	of	sensitive,	unclassified	 electronic	 government	 data	 in	 1973. 11 	NBS	 received	 many	unsatisfactory	 proposals,	 but	 in	 1976	 it	 selected	 IBM’s	 Data	 Encryption	 Standard	(DES).	The	DES	is	a	symmetric-key	algorithm	for	encryption	of	electronic	data	built	with	a	128-bit	key.12	After	consulting	with	the	National	Security	Agency	(NSA),	the	NBS	 accepted	 a	modified	 version	 of	 the	 DES	 in	 collaboration	with	 IMB.	 The	 NSA,	however,	demanded	that	the	NBS’s	modifications	to	the	DES	design	be	kept	secret.	Most	notably	changing	the	128-bit	key	to	a	much	smaller	64-bit	key.	Back	in	those	days,	 this	 algorithm	was	 almost	 entirely	 used	 solely	 by	 the	 government,	 financial	institutions	and	corporations	(unlike	today,	where	most	everyone	has	an	encrypted																																																									11	Levy,	Steve.	“How	the	Code	Rebels	Beat	the	Government	Saving	Privacy	in	the	Digital	Age”,	Penguin	Group:	New	York,	2001.	12	Tuchman,	Walker.	“A	brief	history	of	the	data	encryption	standard",	Internet	besieged:	countering	cyberspace	scofflaws.	ACM	Press/Addison-Wesley	Publishing	Co.	New	York.	1997.	p.	275–280.	
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iPhone).	 As	 Levy	 describes,	 although	most	 cryptographers	 at	 the	 time	worked	 for	tech	 companies	 or	 the	 government,	 curious	 academic	 individuals	 scrutinized	 the	new	 encryption	 standard	 and	 its	 secret	modifications.	 Controversies	 arose	 out	 of	these	 design	 elements,	 and	 the	 NSA’s	 involvement	 nourished	 suspicions	 about	 a	backdoor.		 After	 the	 DES	 was	 published	 in	 the	 Federal	 Register,	 Martin	 Hellman	 and	Whit	 Diffie,	 two	 American	 cryptologists,	 rightly	 suspected	 that	 the	 shortened	 key	length	and	other	modified	elements	were	evidence	of	improper	interference	by	the	NSA.	They	were	suspicious	the	DES	was	covertly	weakened	so	that	the	NSA—but	no	one	 else—could	 easily	 read	 encrypted	messages.13	This	 led	 Diffie	 and	 Hellman	 to	question	the	nature	of	cryptic	schemes.	They	wondered	if	a	hidden	“trapdoor”	(later	referred	to	as	backdoor)	could	be	built	into	an	encryption	system.		 Levy	 explains	 that	 Diffie	 and	 Hellman	 realized,	 “Designing	 such	 a	 system	would	 present	 considerable	 challenges,	 because	 it	 would	 have	 to	 resolve	 a	fundamental	 contradiction.	 A	 trapdoor	 provides	 a	 means	 for	 those	 with	 proper	knowledge	 to	 bypass	 security	 measures	 and	 get	 quick	 access	 to	 encrypted	messages;	 however,	 the	 very	 thought	 of	 using	 a	 trapdoor	 in	 a	 security	 system	seemed	 like	 a	 nutty	 risk,	 precisely	 because	 crafty	 intruders	 might	 find	 a	 way	 to	exploit	it.”	Just	like	a	physical	trapdoor,	if	your	enemies	find	it,	it	is	rendered	useless.	However,	 Diffie	 and	 Hellman’s	 ambition	 and	 curiosity	 to	 build	 a	 complex	 enough	scheme	 to	encrypt	and	decrypt	data	with	a	private	key	developed	over	 the	 years.																																																									13	Diffie,	Whitfield,	Hellman,	Martin	E.	“Exhaustive	Cryptanalysis	of	the	NBS	Data	Encryption	Standard”,	The	Institute	of	Electrical	and	Electronics	Engineers,	Inc.	California:	June	1977.	74–84 
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And	by	1978	they	published	“New	Directions	 in	Cryptography”	creating	the	public	key	encryption	scheme	widely	used	today	(Levy	88).	This	paper	“was	a	revelation,	a	true	blow	against	the	empire”	Levy	enthusiastically	explains.			 To	 understand	 their	 innovation,	 let’s	 examine	 conventional	 encryption	schemes.	 Fundamentally,	 encryption	 schemes	 allow	 for	 the	 process	 of	 encoding	messages	or	information	in	such	a	way	that	only	authorized	parties	can	understand	them.	 Encryption	 does	 not	 prevent	 interception.	 It	 simply	 prevents	 the	 message	from	being	 interpreted	by	 the	 interceptor.	One	problem	Diffie	 and	Hellman	 found	with	conventional	cryptography	was	the	issue	of	key	distribution.	To	unscramble	an	encrypted	 message	 between	 two	 parties,	 both	 parties	 must	 exchange	 a	 secret	decryption	key	prior	to	sending	the	message.	In	an	encryption	scheme,	information	(referred	to	as	plaintext)	 is	scrambled	using	a	mathematical	algorithm,	generating	cipher	text	(gibberish)	that	can	only	be	decoded	by	its	recipient.	This	is	not	a	novel	idea.	Julius	Caesar,	for	example,	used	cipher	text	by	moving	the	last	three	letters	of	the	alphabet	(XYZ)	to	the	front,	and	sliding	the	rest	of	the	letters	three	spaces	down.	Thus,	A	would	correspond	to	X,	B	to	Y,	C	to	Z,	D	to	A,	and	so	on,	allowing	him	to	write	strange	 groupings	of	 letters	 that	 could	 only	 be	 decrypted	 by	 those	who	 know	 the	technique,	 often	 to	 protect	military	 secrets.	 	 The	 same	 idea	 is	 used	with	 sending	information	 today,	 except	 the	 encryption	 keys	 are	 digital.	 The	 diagram	 below	represents	 the	 public	 key	 encryption	 scheme	 used	 today,	 where	 private	conversations	can	be	conducted	without	prior	acquaintance	and	exchange	of	private	keys.	
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14		 In	 this	 encryption	 scheme,	Alice	and	Bob	will	 each	have	 two	keys,	 a	public	one,	 which	 everyone	 can	 see	 and	 use,	 and	 a	 private	 one,	 which	 they	 keep	 secret.	Data	encrypted	with	a	public	key	can	only	be	accessed	using	a	private	key,	and	data	encrypted	with	 a	 private	 key	 can	 only	 be	 accessed	using	 a	 public	 key.	 To	 be	 sure	Alice	sent	the	message,	Bob	can	use	his	public	key	and	Alice’s	private	key	to	encrypt	the	message,	and	upon	delivery	Bob	must	use	his	private	key	and	then	Alice’s	public	key	 to	 access	 the	message	 and	 verify	 it	 is	 from	Alice,	 solving	 the	 key	 distribution	problem.	 Public	 key	 cryptography	 became	 widely	 used	 by	 government	 and	corporations	 alike,	while	 continuing	 to	 develop	 in	 complexity.	What	 distinguishes	this	method	is	that	the	key	used	to	encrypt	the	message	is	not	the	same	key	used	to	decrypt	the	message.																																																										14	Demopoulos,	Ted.	Symmetric	Key	in	Use,	2008.	http://securitycerts.org/review/symmetric-key-in-use.htm	
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	 Public	 key	 cryptography	 is	 often	 used	 to	 secure	 electronic	 communication	over	 an	 open	 networked	 environment	 such	 as	 the	 Internet,	 without	 relying	 on	 a	hidden	or	covert	channel,	even	for	key	exchange.	Open	networked	environments	are	susceptible	 to	a	variety	of	 communication	security	problems,	 such	as	“man-in-the-middle	attacks”:	where	an	eavesdropper	can	intercept	encrypted	messages.			 However,	since	the	advent	of	public	key	cryptography,	the	term	trapdoor	has	acquired	 a	 different	meaning,	 and	 thus	 the	 term	 "backdoor"	 is	 now	preferred.	 As	noted	earlier,	a	backdoor	is	a	deliberate	mechanism	that	is	added	to	a	cryptographic	algorithm	 (e.g.,	 a	 key	 pair	 generation	 algorithm,	 digital	 signing	 algorithm,	 etc.)	 or	operating	 system,	 for	 example,	 that	 permits	 one	 or	more	 unauthorized	 parties	 to	bypass	or	subvert	the	security	of	the	system	in	some	fashion.		 According	 to	 Chris	 Wysopal	 in	 his	 paper,	 “Static	 Detection	 of	 Application	Backdoors”,	 there	 are	 many	 types	 of	 backdoors	 that	 can	 be	 used	 today	 (system	backdoors,	application	backdoors,	crypto	backdoors).	The	details	of	how	each	work	are	 extensive	 and	 insignificant	 for	 the	 purpose	 of	 this	 paper.	 Wysopal	 explains,	however,	“Application	backdoors	do	not	require	much	sophistication	to	create	and	there	 is	 ample	motivation	 for	 bad	 actors	 to	 create	 them.	 Backdoors	 are	 trivial	 to	exploit	 once	 the	 word	 gets	 out	 so	 response	 must	 be	 very	 quick.	 The	 negative	reputation	impact	to	the	vendor	of	the	effected	software	is	often	much	higher	than	the	negative	 impact	 from	a	typical	vulnerability.”	Thus,	backdoors	have	acquired	a	negative	 reputation	 among	 tech	 experts,	 as	 backdoor	 software	 has	 been	implemented	for	many	nefarious	purposes	throughout	the	past	decade.		
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	 Moreover,	in	recent	years,	there	are	numerous	accounts	of	software	created	with	 backdoors	 that	 are	 now	 considered	malware.	 Two	 significant	 examples	with	discovered	 backdoor	 problems	 include	 “Back	Orifice”	 and	WordPress	 plug-in.	The	Back	Orifice	was	a	program	created	in	1998	by	the	hacker	group	called	“The	Cult	of	the	 Dead	 Cow”.	 Back	 Orifice	 was	 a	 play-on-words	 for	 the	 Microsoft	 program	BackOffice.	Back	Orifice	was	created	as	a	backdoor	that	allowed	computers	running	Microsoft	Windows	to	be	controlled	remotely	over	a	network.	15		 Another	example	is	WordPress.	WordPress	is	a	free	and	open-source	content	management	 system	 (CMS).	 It	 is	 commonly	 run	 as	 a	 software	 package:	WordPress.org.	 However,	 it	 has	 a	 poor	 track	 record	 of	 security.	 WordPress	 has	many	 plugins	 available	 that	 users	 download	 for	 free.	However,	 sneaky	 bad	 actors	have	easily	pirated	copies	of	plug-ins	and	provide	them	“free”	over	the	Internet	for	download.	 Free	 plug-ins	 are	 surreptitiously	 patched	 to	 include	 backdoors,	 which	allow	 for	 spam	 and	 malice	 attacks. 16 	These	 plug-ins	 are	 so	 widespread	 that	WordPress’	own	website	provides	detailed	instructions	“for	beginners”	on	detecting	and	deleting	hidden	malware.17	Although	these	cases	provide	some	insight	into	the	many	ways	the	concept	of	backdoors	can	be	used	maliciously,	could	the	right	people	use	 a	 backdoor	 for	 a	 legitimate	 reason?	Or	 rather,	 could	 an	 encryption	 system	be	designed	 to	 be	 both	 impenetrable	 to	 intruders,	 yet	 accessible	 through	 lawful	government	requests?																																																									15	Richtel,	Matt.	“Hacker	Group	Says	Program	Can	Exploit	Microsoft	Security	Holes”	
New	York	Times	August	4,	1998.	16	Sineubko,	Denis.	“Unmasking	“Free”	Premium	WordPress	Plugins.	Sucuri	Blog.	March	26,	2014.	17	Editorial	Staff,	“How	to	Find	a	Backdoor	in	a	Hacked	WordPress	Site	and	Fix	It”,	
Wpbeginner	Blog:	November	28,	2012.	
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Local	Law	Enforcement’s	Solutions	to	Going	Dark			 On	the	local	law	enforcement	level,	there	is	a	growing	concern	about	strong	encryption	 on	 cell	 phones	 connected	 to	 a	 significant	 number	 of	 criminal	investigations.	Similar	to	the	San	Bernardino	case,	there	are	countless	local	criminal	investigations	effected	by	strong	encryption.	Many	government	officials	are	calling	for	 a	 policy	 that	mandates	 government	 access	 to	 telecommunications.	 Thus,	 both	local	law	enforcement	and	the	FBI	want	to	be	able	to	open	any	phone	with	a	lawful	warrant.	One	proposed	 solution	would	be	 to	mandate	phone	companies	 to	design	devices	 with	 the	 capability	 of	 being	 accessed	 by	 targeted	 lawfully	 government	requests.		 Cyrus	Vance	Jr.,	the	New	York	District	Attorney	(Manhattan),	and	prominent	mandated	 access	 advocate,	 testified	 before	 the	 U.S.	 Senate	 Committee	 on	 the	Judiciary	 in	 July	 of	 2015.	 In	 response	 to	 Apple	 and	 Google	 installment	 of	 robust	encryption	software	on	its	products	by	default,	Vance	argued,	“requiring	phones	to	be	 manufactured	 so	 that	 they	 would	 be	 accessible	 to	 law	 enforcement	 through	lawfully	obtained	search	warrants”(Vance	17).	Although	this	 testimony	never	uses	the	term	“backdoor”,	on	a	 technical	 level	 there	 is	no	other	way	to	gain	“access”	 to	encrypted	data	other	than	creating	a	backdoor.	Vance	also	states,	 “I	am	proposing	here…a	return	to	the	balanced	approach	in	place	prior	to	the	introduction	of	iOS	8”	(Vance	 17).	 Regardless	 of	 the	merits	 and	 concerns	 for	 both	 privacy	 and	 security,	technology	 is	a	 tempestuous	train	of	progress	driving	 forward,	unlikely	persuaded	
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to	 “return”	 or	 backtrack.	 Nevertheless,	 how	 does	 backdoor	 technology	work,	 and	what	are	some	of	its	advantages	(advocated	for	by	the	law	enforcement)	and	what	are	its	disadvantages?		 Moreover,	 Vance	 claims	 “It	 is	 not	 hyperbole	 to	 say	 that	 beginning	 in	September	 2014,	 Americans	 conceded	 a	 measure	 of	 their	 protection	 against	everyday	 crimes	 to	 Apple	 and	 Google’s	 new	 encryption	 policies”	 (Vance	 4).	 He	 is	referring	 to	 the	 fact	 that,	 Apple	 and	Google	 significantly	 increased	 the	 encryption	capabilities	of	their	products	shortly	after	Edward	Snowden’s	leak	of	NSA	classified	global	surveillance	programs.	One	of	the	reasons	law	enforcement	is	frustrated	with	Apple	and	Goggle’s	implementation	of	robust	encryption	systems,	is	that	it	was	done	so	 by	 default.	 Many	 government	 officials	 argue	 this	 is	 unconstitutional,	 and	 that	giving	consumers	a	chance	to	choose	between	using	strong	encryption	or	not,	would	be	more	appropriate.	Perhaps	if	consumers	had	a	choice,	many	would	choose	not	to	use	 it,	 as	 people	 are	 inherently	 lazy	 and	 if	 it	 took	 extra	 steps	 to	 use,	 perhaps	 the	average	American	would	find	the	task	superfluous.	This	logic	is	impractical,	as	Apple	and	 Google	 appear	 to	 have	 no	 intention	 of	 considering	 this	 modification	 to	 their	business	model.	They	 implemented	this	security	strategy	 for	both	proprietary	and	economic	purposes,	as	well	as	for	the	security	of	their	customers.	Hypothetically,	if	they	did	offer	encryption	not	by	default,	any	criminal	or	 terrorist	not	utilizing	this	security	feature,	would	most	likely	be	caught	or	thwarted	long	before	the	going	dark	issue	 would	 apply	 for	 a	 number	 of	 reasons	 relating	 to	 their	 significant	 lack	 of	intelligence.		
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	 Moreover,	 there	are	a	number	of	concerns	with	having	a	significant	portion	of	people	not	using	secure	methods	of	communication,	as	we	will	see.	Nevertheless,	not	offering	encryption	by	default	seems	 impractical	 to	be	successfully	 implement,	as	well	as	not	being	a	meaningful	solution	to	going	dark	concerns.	As	we	have	seen	on	the	local	law	enforcement	level,	arguments	surrounding	the	going	dark	issue	are	persuasive	 because	 they	 are	 tangible.	 Law	 enforcement	 can	 cite	 real	 cases	where	technology	 has	 separated	 evidence	 from	 crimes	 and	 criminals	 from	 persecution.	However,	it	is	important	to	keep	in	mind	that	encryption	and	going	dark	affects	all	levels	of	security,	from	local	law	enforcement	to	the	NSA,	and	as	we	rise,	so	does	the	complexity	 of	 the	 issue.	 It	 becomes	 less	 concrete	 and	 more	 abstract	 and	hypothetical.				 Yet,	Government	officials,	such	as	Vance,	argue	that	highly	secure	encrypted	communication	poses	national	security	risks.	According	to	FBI	Director	Comey,	law	enforcement	 is	 seeing	more	and	more	 cases	where	 it	believes	 significant	evidence	can	be	found	on	a	phone,	tablet,	or	laptop,	and	that	this	evidence	that	may	make	the	difference	on	whether	the	offender	is	convicted	or	acquitted.18	 
	 Tim	Cook	publicly	acknowledged	its	security	modification	and	its	impact	on	law	enforcement.	According	to	Cook	in	a	message	posted	on	Apple	Inc.’s	website:		“On	devices	 running	 iOS	8.0	and	 later	versions,	 your	personal	data	 such	as	photos,	 messages	 (including	 attachments),	 email,	 contacts,	 call	 history,	iTunes	content,	notes,	and	reminders	is	placed	under	the	protection	of	your																																																									18	Comey,	James	“Directory	Comey	Discusses	Investigative	Challenges	in	Light	of	New	Methods	of	Electronic	Communications”	Fbi.org.	March	1,	2016.	
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passcode…	 Apple	 will	 not	 perform	 iOS	 data	 extractions	 in	 response	 to	government	search	warrants	because	the	files	to	be	extracted	are	protected	by	an	encryption	key	that	is	tied	to	the	user’s	passcode,	which	Apple	does	not	possess.”19			 Law	enforcement	is	extremely	concerned	about	the	serious	threat	posed	by	the	use	of	robust	encryption	products	that	do	not	allow	for	authorized	access	or	the	timely	 decryption	 of	 critical	 evidence,	 obtained	 through	 lawful	 electronic	surveillance	and	search	and	seizure.			 Comey	states,	 “If	at	 the	end	of	 the	day	the	American	people	say,	 ‘you	know	what,	we’re	okay	with	that	portion	of	the	room	being	dark.	We’re	okay	with’—to	use	one	 example—“the	 FBI,	 in	 the	 first	 10	months	 of	 this	 year,	 getting	 5,000	 devices	from	state	and	local	law	enforcement	and	asked	for	assistance	in	opening	them,	and	in	 650	 of	 those	 devices	 being	 unable	 to	 open	 those	 devices.”	 That’s	 criminals	 not	caught,	 that’s	 evidence	 not	 found,	 that’s	 sentences	 that	 are	 far,	 far	 shorter	 for	pedophiles	 and	 others	 because	 judges	 can’t	 see	 the	 true	 scope	 of	 their	 activity”	(Comey,	“The	FBI’s	Approach	to	the	Cyber	Threat”).	To	put	matters	in	contexts,	“the	New	 York	 County	 District	 Attorney’s	 Office	 handles	 more	 than	 100,000	 criminal	cases	each	year,	which	 is	more	than	all	of	 the	cases	handled	by	the	Department	of	Justice	nationwide.	And	the	range	of	those	cases	is	broad	–	from	murder,	rape,	and	robbery,	to	identity	theft,	financial	fraud,	and	terrorism”	(Vance	1),	states	Vance	in	a	testimony	before	the	United	States	Senate	Committee	on	the	Judiciary.	He	explains	how	people	“live	their	lives	today	on	their	smartphone”	and	use	them	for	“emailing,																																																									19	Cook,	Tim.	“We	Believe	Security	Shouldn’t	Come	at	the	Expense	of	Individual	Privacy”	Apple.com/Privacy.	Accessed	on	October	23,	2016.	
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texting,	 taking	 pictures,	 posting	 pictures,	 shopping,	 conducting	 business,	 and	searching	the	web”	(Vance	2)	and	to	investigate	those	100,000	cases	without	access	to	their	phones	makes	it	nearly	impossible.			 To	illustrate	this	point,	Vance	describes	how	a	father	of	six	was	murdered	in	Evanston,	Illinois.	The	city	police	believe	he	was	robbed	of	a	large	sum	of	money	just	prior	 to	his	murder,	however	no	were	no	witnesses	or	 surveillance	 footage	of	 the	killing.	 However,	 an	 iPhone	 6	 and	 a	 Samsung	 Galaxy	 S6	 Edge	 running	 Google	Android	were	found	at	the	scene.	Believing	that	relevant	evidence	might	be	stored	on	them,	the	Cook	County	prosecutors	served	Apple	and	Google	warrants	to	unlock	the	 phones.	 However,	 due	 to	 the	 phones’	 end-to-end	 encryption,	 never	 company	was	 capable	 of	 unlocking	 them,	 and	 the	 homicide	 remains	 unsolved	 (Vance	 4).	Vance	continues	to	explain	how	his	Office	“obtains	smartphone	evidence	to	support	all	 types	 of	 cases	 –	 homicides,	 sex	 crimes,	 child	 abuse,	 fraud,	 assaults,	 robberies,	cybercrime,	 and	 identity	 theft”	 (Vance	 2).	 Disturbingly,	 it’s	 no	 stretch	 of	 the	imagination	that	sexual	offenders	especially,	might	take	photos	and	videos	of	their	acts,	 and	 store	 them	on	 computers	 and	 smartphones.	 Vance	 states	 that	 “Between	October	2014	and	 June	2015,	35	percent	of	 the	data	extracted	 from	all	phones	by	[his]	 Office	 was	 collected	 from	 Apple	 devices;	 36	 percent	 was	 collected	 from	Android	devices.	That	means	that	when	smartphone	encryption	is	fully	deployed	by	Apple	 and	 Google,	 71	 percent	 of	 all	 mobile	 devices	 examined—at	 least	 by	 [his]	Office’s	lab—may	be	outside	the	reach	of	a	search	warrant.”			 As	 serious	 as	 these	 problems	may	 be	 for	 the	 District	 Attorneys	 office,	 it	 is	important	 to	 note	 that	 this	 testimony	 was	 written	 in	 July	 of	 2015.	 Thus,	 it	 was	
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before	the	FBI	was	able	to	crack	the	phone	from	the	San	Bernardino	case	with	the	aid	 of	 a	 third	 party.	 Law	 enforcement	 has	 claimed	 it	 has	 the	 ability	 to	 open	 any	device	 running	 the	 same	 operating	 system	 (iOS	 9).	 That	 being	 said,	 a	 significant	portion	 of	 the	 collected	 phones	Vance	 has	mentioned	 in	 the	 testimony	should	 be,	therefore,	 accessible.	 Law	 enforcement	 shouldn’t	 blame	 Apple	 or	 Google	 for	difficulty	collecting	criminal	evidence	committed	until	around	2016	(when	the	new	iOS	 10	 was	 released).	 	 Nevertheless,	 more	 and	 more	 criminals,	 now	 using	 the	updated	 software,	 are	digitally	 safe	 from	conviction.	 In	2016	Vance	 stated,	 “In	my	office	 alone,	 we	 now	 have	 270	 lawfully-seized	 iPhones…	 that	 are	 completely	inaccessible.”			 	In	the	San	Bernardino	case,	the	FBI	claimed	they	only	wanted	to	access	one	particular	 phone	 contributing	 to	 a	 terrorist	 investigation.	 Forced	 to	 hack	 into	 the	phone,	 and	 presumably	 gaining	 the	 ability	 hack	 into	 any	 phone	 of	made	with	 the	same	 operating	 system,	 the	 going	 dark	 problem	 remains.	 Many	 of	 those	 in	government	agencies	are	calling	for	mandating	access	to	encrypted	devices.	So	the	question	becomes:	can	we	design	a	system	that	would	allow	government	access	to	these	devices?	How	might	it	look,	and	what	consequences	will	it	bring?		
Government	Mandated	Access:	Key	Escrow	Encryption	
		 This	is	the	question	many	leading	law	enforcement	officials	are	asking	today,	although	 it	 is	 not	 a	 new	 idea.	 In	 1993	 the	 U.S.	 created	 the	 Clipper	 Chip,	 a	 chip	developed	and	promoted	by	 the	NSA.	 It	was	 intended	 to	be	built	 into	 commercial	
	 25	
phones	 sold	 by	 telecommunication	 companies,	 such	 as	 AT&T.	 Matt	 Blaze,	 a	cryptography	 researcher	 at	 the	 University	 of	 Pennsylvania	 mentions,	 “The	government	 has	 stated	 that	 the	 goal	 of	 the	 [Clipper	 chip	 software]	 is	 to	 make	 a	strong	 cipher	 available	 for	 legitimate	 use	 without	 supplying	 criminals	 and	 other	adversaries	with	a	tool	that	can	be	used	against	American	interests	or	to	hide	illegal	activities	from	law	enforcement.”20			 This	example	is	interesting	for	multiple	reasons.	The	Clipper	Chip	was	a	piece	of	 hardware	 that	 uses	 encryption	 algorithms	 similar	 to	 the	 Diffie-Hellman	 key	exchange	 algorithm.	 This	 is	 somewhat	 ironic	 in	 that	 the	government	 agency	 itself	developed	 a	 tamperproof	 product	 that	 a	 decade	 earlier	 it	was	 fighting	 to	 limit.	 In	addition,	there	is	irony	in	the	fact	the	NSA	built	technology	that	is	analogous	to	what	FBI	 director	 James	 Comey	 is	 currently	 criticizing	 the	 tech	 industry	 for	 creating.	When	talking	about	Apple	products,	Comey	states,	“it	takes	us	to	a	place	of	absolute	privacy	that	we	have	not	been	to	before	where	the	balance	we	have	 long	struck	 is	fundamentally	 challenged.”	 (James	 Comey,	 “Expectations	 of	 Privacy:	 Balancing	Liberty,	Security,	and	Public	Safety”).	However,	the	Clipper	Chip	did	have	a	built	in	backdoor	 allowing	 government	 access	 to	 the	 phones	 data.	 This	 is	 an	 example	 of	what	 is	 called	 a	 key	 escrow	 encryption	 system.	 In	 theory,	 once	 the	 key	 is	compromised,	 all	 of	 the	 data	 the	 key	 protected	 is	 vulnerable.	 This	method	 differs	from	end-to-end	 encryption,	which	 is	how	Apple	protects	 its	products	 information	stored	on	devices	and	 in	 transit,	meaning	only	 the	user	 can	 read	 the	message.	An	analogy	 would	 be	 the	 way	 modern	 ships	 use	 compartmentalized	 hulls	 to	 avoid																																																									20	Blaze,	Matt.	“Protocol	Failure	in	the	Escrowed	Encryption	Standard”,	AT&T	Bell	Laboratories,	August	20,	1994.	p.	59–67. 
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capsizing.	If	the	ship’s	hull	is	completely	hollow,	one	break	in	the	wall	and	the	entire	ship	will	be	flooded	with	water.	However	if	the	hull	is	compartmentalized	so	there	are	many	“room”	inside	the	hull	of	the	ship,	if	one	wall	is	pierced,	only	one	room	will	be	 filled	 with	 water.	 The	 same	 goes	 for	 end-to-end	 encryption.	 If	 a	 key	 is	compromised,	 then	 only	 the	 data	 from	 that	 access	 point	 can	 be	 stolen,	 and	 the	system	as	a	whole	 is	protected.	Apple	uses	and	encryption	key,	 your	passcode,	 to	encrypt	the	device	and	all	information	stored	on	the	device.			 The	reason	it	is	difficult	to	break	open	an	iPhone	is	because	once	the	key	is	used	to	open	the	device,	 it	 is	not	stored	on	the	device,	but	 immediately	destroyed.	Moreover,	iPhones	only	allow	a	few	attempts	to	guess	the	passcode	before	locking	up.	Therefore,	a	hacker	cannot	use	“brute	force”	to	open	the	phone:	using	a	machine	to	 guess	 millions	 of	 passcodes	 in	 seconds,	 because	 after	 a	 few	 wrong	 guess	 the	hacker	is	locked	out.	Furthermore,	Apple	has	end-to-end	encryption	of	iMessage	and	FaceTime,	meaning	communications	through	these	channels	cannot	be	intercepted	and	decrypted,	as	an	eavesdropper	would	not	have	access	to	any	decryption	keys.	By	contrast,	key	escrow	encryption	is	an	arrangement	 in	which	an	authorized	third	party	holds	the	keys	needed	to	decrypt	encrypted	data.			 In	 this	 case,	 the	 built-in	 Clipper	 chips	 would	 hold	 the	 keys	 available	 to	government	agencies	when	needed.	It	seemed	unlikely	consumers	would	have	had	any	 idea	 what	 they	 were	 purchasing.	 Nevertheless,	 Matt	 Blaze,	 a	 Cryptography	researcher	at	Princeton	University,	in	1994	published	the	paper	Protocol	Failure	in	
the	 Escrowed	 Encryption	 Standard.	 This	 paper	 pointed	 out	 how	 vulnerabilities	pervaded	 the	 Clipper	 chip.	 In	 his	 research	 paper,	Matt	 Blaze	 states	 that,	 “several	
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approaches	 can	 easily	 circumvent	 the	 law	 enforcement	 access	mechanism,	with	 a	range	 of	 practicality	 and	 tradeoffs.”	 In	 other	 words,	 the	 system	 was	 easily	exploitable	 by	 hackers.	 When	 considering	 if	 the	 software’s	 architecture	 could	 be	improved	 or	 modified,	 Blaze	 concludes	 that,	 “It	 is	 not	 clear	 that	 it	 is	 possible	 to	construct	 an	 EES	 (escrow	 encryption	 standard)	 system	 that	 is	 both	 completely	invulnerable	to	all	kinds	of	exploitation	as	well	as	generally	useful.”			 Matt	Blaze’s	study	was	able	to	find	significant	vulnerabilities	in	this	specific	example	of	 a	key	escrow	encryption	 system,	however	 could	 the	government	work	with	tech	companies	today	to	develop	a	modern,	more	secure	version?	This	 is	 the	solution	that	many	Law	enforcement	officials	have	asking	for.	They	believe	it	to	be	the	 best	 constitutionally	 acceptable	 answer	 to	 the	 going	 dark	 dilemma.	 However	tech	experts	claim	any	key	escrow	system	is	inherent	flaw,	as	the	Clipper	Chip	is	just	on	of	many	examples.		 There	are	two	principle	obstacles	for	a	third-party	escrow	encryption	system	according	to	a	group	of	computer	scientist	at	MIT	in	their	paper	called	“Keys	Under	Doormats:	Mandating	 Insecurity	 by	 requiring	Government	Access	 to	All	 Data	And	Communications.21	The	 first	 is	 that	 “although	 the	mode	of	 encrypting	a	 symmetric	key	with	a	public	key	 is	 in	common	use,	companies	are	aggressively	moving	away	from	 it	 because	 of	 a	 significant	 practical	 vulnerability:	 if	 an	 entity’s	 private	 key	 is	ever	 breached,	 all	 data	 ever	 secured	 with	 this	 public	 key	 is	 immediately																																																									21	Abelson,	Harold,	Ross	Anderson,	Steven	M.	Bellovin,	Josh	Benaloh,	Matt	Blaze,	Whitfield	Diffie,	John	Glimore,	Mathew	Green,	Susan	Landau,	Peter	G.	Neumann,	Ronald	Rivest,	Jeffrey	Schiller,	Bruce	Schneier,	Michael	Specter,	and	Daniel	Weitzner.	“Keys	Under	Doormats:	Mandating	insecurity	by	requiring	government	access	to	all	Data	Communications,”	Massachusetts	Institute	of	Technology,	Cambridge.	July	6,	2015. p.	12 
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compromised.	Because	it	 is	unwise	to	assume	a	network	will	never	be	breached,	a	single	 failure	 should	 never	 compromise	 all	 data	 that	 was	 ever	 encrypted.”		Companies	are,	therefore,	using	“forward	secrecy”:	a	system	in	which	a	new	key	is	generated	with	each	transaction	and	discarded	afterwards.	Thus,	there	is	much	less	information	vulnerable	to	attackers.	“When	a	system	with	forward	secrecy	is	used,	an	attacker	who	breaches	a	network	and	gains	access	to	keys	can	only	decrypt	data	from	 the	 time	of	 the	breach	until	 the	breach	 is	discovered	and	 rectified;	historical	data	remains	safe”	(Abelson	12).		 The	other	obstacle	is	the	procedural	difficultly	in	designing	a	third-party	key	escrow	 system.	 Who	 would	 control	 the	 keys?	 Within	 the	 United	 States,	 the	 FBI	would	most	 likely	 hold	 the	 private	 key	with	 access	 to	 data	warranted	 by	 judicial	mechanisms,	allowing	it	to	be	employed	for	a	number	of	federal,	state,	and	local	law	enforcement	 cases.	 However,	 as	 Google	 and	 Apple	 are	massive	 global	 companies,	with	Androids	and	 iPhones	all	across	the	world,	 this	leaves	unanswered	questions	about	what	would	happen	 outside	 a	 our	 nation’s	 borders.	 This	MIT	 study	 further	poses	the	question:	“Would	 German	 and	 French	 public-	 and	 private-sector	 organizations	 be	willing	 to	use	 systems	 that	gave	 the	US	government	access	 to	 their	data	—	especially	 when	 they	 could	 instead	 use	 locally	 built	 systems	 that	 do	 not?	What	about	Russia?	Would	encrypted	data	transmitted	between	the	US	and	China	 need	 to	 have	 keys	 escrowed	 by	 both	 governments?	 Could	 a	 single	escrow	agent	be	found	that	would	be	acceptable	to	both	governments?	If	so,	
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would	access	be	granted	to	 just	one	of	 the	two	governments	or	would	both	need	to	agree	to	a	request?”(12)		 Furthermore,	 there	 are	 broader	 economic	 issues	 to	 consider.	 Democratic	economic	growth	is	capable	due	to	innovations	in	science,	technology	and	business	processes.	 Today,	 digital	 products	 and	 services	 are	 imbedded	with	 new	 apps	 and	web	services.	 “Increasingly	these	are	also	“social	Countries	 that	require	these	new	apps	 and	 web	 services	 to	 have	 their	 user-to-user	 communications	 functions	authorized	by	the	government	will	be	at	a	significant	disadvantage.	At	present,	the	world	largely	uses	US	apps	and	services,	rather	than	the	government-approved	ones	from	Russia	and	China.	This	provides	enormous	leverage	to	US	businesses.”			 Although	much	of	the	debate	in	the	media	and	among	privacy	advocates	has	focused	on	whether	Director	Comey	is	asking	for	companies	like	Google	and	Apple	to	 create	 backdoors,	 no	 formal	 proposals	 have	 emerged	 from	 the	 FBI	 or	 other	members	 of	 the	 law	 enforcement	 and	 intelligence	 communities.	 In	 July	 2015,	Director	Comey	stated	 in	Senate	 Judiciary	and	House	Intelligence	Committees	that	“while	there	has	not	yet	been	a	decision	whether	to	seek	legislation,	we	must	work	with	Congress,	industry	academics,	privacy	groups,	and	others	to	craft	an	approach	that	addresses	all	of	the	multiple,	competing	legitimate	concerns	that	have	been	the	focus	of	so	much	debate	in	recent	months”	(Comey,	“Going	Dark”).	Director	Comey	has	also	asked	that	rather	than	pursue	a	legislative	mandate,	instead	he	advocates	to	“continue	conversations	with	industry”	to	find	voluntary	solutions.	Furthermore,	he	has	 called	 on	 the	 private	 sector	 for	help	 in	 identifying	 solutions	 that	provide	 that	
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maintain	 public	 cyber	 security	 without	 impeding	 lawful	 government	 surveillance	efforts.		
The	Dangers	of	Exceptional	Access	and	Key	Escrow	Encryption			 In	 light	 of	 many	 technological	 security	 failures	 of	 today,	 many	 computer	scientists	 and	 security	 experts	 argue	 the	 need	 for	 more	 security	 technology	 and	stronger	 encryption	 across	 the	 board.	 In	 2014	 and	 2015,	 for	 instance,	 “unnamed	hackers	–	probably	the	Chinese	government	–	stole	21.5	million	personal	files	of	U.S.	government	 employees	 and	 others”,	 explains	Bruce	 Schenier,	 a	 computer	 security	professor	 at	 Harvard	 University.	 He	 claims	 these	 hackers	wouldn’t	 have	 obtained	this	 data	 if	 it	 had	 been	 better	 protected	 by	 encryption.22	Many	 similar	 large-scale	criminal	data	hacks	have	been	made	both	either	easier	and	more	damaging	because	data	wasn’t	 encrypted	 for	 companies	 such	as	Target,	TJ	Maxx,	Heartland	Payment	Systems,	and	so	on.			 One	of	the	most	remarkable	backdoor	hacking	pulled	off	in	2004	has	become	known	as	“The	Athens	Affair”.	Vodafone,	a	British	multinational	telecommunications	company	and	Greece’s	 largest	 cellular	service	provider,	built	backdoor	access	 into	Greece’s	 cell	 phone	 network	 for	 the	Greek	 government.	 In	March	 of	 2005,	 it	 was	discovered	that	the	Prime	Minister	of	Greece’s	cellphone	was	being	bugged,	as	well	
																																																								22	Schneier,	Bruce.	“Security	or	Surveillance?”	Lawfare	Blog,	February	1,	2016.	Accessed	on	September	12,	2016. 
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as	 the	mayor	of	Athens	and	at	 least	100	other	high-ranking	dignitaries.23	Although	the	 identity	 of	 perpetrators	 debated	 (many	 believe	 it	 to	 be	 United	 States’	 handy	work),	 these	 clever	 perpetrators	 either	 penetrated	 the	 network	 from	 outside	 or	from	the	 inside	with	the	help	of	a	mole.	We	can	only	image	the	store	of	 incredibly	sensitive	political	and	diplomatic	discussions,	not	to	mention	personal	information	that	was	routinely	overheard	and	probably	recorded.24	Because	these	phones	were	manufactured	with	backdoors	intended	for	government	use	and	control,	the	hackers	were	able	to	break	into	the	telephone	network	and	subvert	its	built-in	wiretapping	features	for	their	own	purpose.				 Another	significant	breach	of	security	occurred	 in	2010,	when	the	NSA	and	its	 British	 counterpart	 GCHQ,	 or	 Government	 Communications	 Headquarters,	hacked	 into	the	computer	network	of	 the	largest	manufacturer	of	SIM	cards	 in	 the	world,	 Gemalto,	 and	 stealing	 encryption	 keys	 used	 to	 protect	 cellphone	communications.	 Documents	 leaked	 by	 Edward	 Snowden	 claimed	 these	 spy	agencies	were	able	 to	manipulate	billing	records	to	conceal	 their	own	activity	and	had	access	to	authentication	servers	to	decrypt	both	voice	calls	and	text	messages.	25	As	a	 result,	 the	NSA	and	GCHQ	compromised	 the	 security	of	potentially	billions	of	phones	worldwide.	Moreover,	the	only	way	to	address	the	security	compromise	is	to	recall	 every	 SIM	 sold	 by	 Gemalto,	 which	 would	 be	 exceedingly	 expensive	 and	difficult.		
																																																								23	Prevelakis,	Vassilis,	Diomidis	Spinellis,	“The	Athens	Affair,”	IEEE	Spectrum,	June	27,	2007.	24	Vassilis	Prevelakis,	Diomidis	Spinellis,	“The	Athens	Affair,”	IEEE	Spectrum,	June	27,	2007.	25	https://theintercept.com/2015/02/19/great-sim-heist/	
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	 Furthermore,	 in	2013	we	 learned	 the	Chinese	Government	hacked	Google’s	team	 that	 interacts	 with	 government	 surveillance	 requests.	 The	 Chinese	Government	 breached	 Google’s	 database	 in	 order	 to	 gain	 access	 to	 classified	information	 about	 suspected	 spies,	 agents,	 and	 terrorist	 under	 US	 government	surveillance.	 David	 W.	 Aucsmith,	 senior	 director	 of	 Microsoft’s	 Institute	 for	Advanced	 Technology	 in	Governments,	 claims	 this	 is	 brilliant	 counterintelligence.	He	sais	“you	have	two	choices:	If	you	want	to	find	out	if	you	agents,	if	you	will,	have	been	discovered,	you	can	try	to	break	into	the	FBI	to	find	out	that	way.	Presumably	that’s	difficult.	Or	you	can	break	into	the	people	that	the	courts	have	served	paper	on	and	see	 if	 you	can	 find	 it	 that	way.	That’s	essentially	what	we	 think	 they	were	trolling	for.”26	This	type	of	breach	of	information	would	not	have	been	possible	with	more	robust	forms	of	security	systems.	Google	has	a	team	of	300	engineers	just	for	cyber	 security.	 If	 Google	 and	 Microsoft,	 both	 leaders	 in	 the	 technology	 industry,	cannot	protect	their	data,	what	hope	is	there	for	the	rest	of	us,	if	we	start	weakening	our	encryption	systems?		 The	 list	 goes	 on.	 Syria’s	 computer	 hacking	 group	 SEA	 (Syrian	 Electronic	Army)	hacked	Skype’s	Facebook,	Twitter	and	blog,	posting	an	SEA	related	picture	and	 telling	 users	 not	 to	 use	 Microsoft's	 e-mail	 service	Outlook.com,	 claiming	 that	Microsoft	sells	user	 information	to	the	government.27	They	also	hacked	the	official	Microsoft	Office	Blog,	posting	several	images	and	tweeted	about	the	attack.	
																																																								26	https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/chinese-hackers-who-breached-google-gained-access-to-sensitive-data-us-officials-say/2013/05/20/51330428-be34-11e2-89c9-3be8095fe767_story.html?utm_term=.5c67f1969fd6	27	Shira	Ovide	(1	January	2014).	"Skype	Social	Media	Accounts	Hacked	by	Syrian	Electronic	Army".	Wall	Street	Journal.	Dow	Jones.	Retrieved	22	March	2015.	
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	 Strong	 security	 and	 the	 protection	 of	 sensitive	 information	 is	 paramount	with	regards	to	fair	and	ethical	business	practices	today.	Not	only	do	businesses	in	the	banking	and	finance	industries	have	a	legal	obligation	to	prevent	inside	trading,	some	 tech	experts	argue	even	 lawyers,	 “have	an	ethical	obligation	to	protect	your	communications,	 and	 if	 [they]	 don’t,	 [they]	 are	 engaging	 arguably	 in	 unethical	conduct.”28			 In	conclusion,	when	it	going	dark,	it	seems	impossible	for	the	government	to	practically	solve	the	going	dark	solution	by	weakening	encryption;	by	using	any	sort	of	 encryption	 scheme.	 Hypothetically,	 even	 if	 the	 Government	 was	 successful	 in	gaining	access	to	Apple	and	Google	i.e.,	there	will	always	be	other	means	by	which	nefarious	actors	can	secure	their	communications.	There	are	many	encryption	apps	available	 for	 download,	 and	 new	 ones	 are	 sprouted	 every	 day.	 Most	 notable	 is	Whatsapp,	a	free	instant	messaging	application	that	enables	end-to-end	encryption	for	both	messaging	and	voice	calls.		
29																																																									28	(22:22).	29	This	diagram	illustrates	the	difference	between	standard	encrypted	instant	messaging	and	Whatsapp	end-to-end	messaging.	
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	Moreover,	 on	 the	 Internet	 side	 of	 the	 matter,	 there	 are	 dozens	 of	 VPN’s	 (virtual	private	 networks)	 free	 for	 download.	 VPNs	 cloaks	 and	 encrypts	 web-browsing	signals,	making	online	activity	 completely	 illegible	 to	any	eavesdropper.	They	also	manipulate	IP	addresses,	making	it	appear	as	though	one	is	browsing	the	web	from	a	machine	or	location	different	than	where	they	truly	are	operating.		 Ultimately,	it	seems	weakening	the	system	to	allow	“good”	guys	access	(our	government,	 supposedly)	 will	 also	 allow	 “bad”	 guys	 access.	 There	 cannot	 be	 one	without	 the	other,	and	there	 is	no	to	discriminate	 intent.	Trying	to	decide	on	how	best	 to	 solve	 the	 going	 dark	 problem	 seems	 to	 produce	 more	 questions	 then	answers.	 However,	 this	 analysis	 shows	 strong	widespread	 encryption	 protects	 us	from	malicious	hackers	and	foreign	governments,	and	we	should	consider	any	and	all	other	possible	solutions	before	considering	weakening	these	systems	to	required	mandated	access.			
Chapter	2:	The	Golden	Age	Of	Surveillance			 As	we	have	discussed,	mandating	access	fails	as	an	optimal	solution	to	going	dark.	 Many	 tech	 experts	 believe	 this	 is	 simply	 technologically	 impossible.	 This	leaves	 government	 officials,	 lawmakers,	 and	 citizens	 in	 a	 legally	 and	 ethically	perplexing	position.	However,	 there	are	many	 that	believe	 the	going	dark	 issue	 is	not	as	threatening	as	the	government	agencies	claims.	There	may	not	be	one	be	all	
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end	 all	 solution,	 however	 there	 are	 a	 number	 of	 promising	 avenues	 available	 to	make	the	best	of	our	current	situation.		 As	tensions	have	dissipated	in	the	media	since	the	Apple	dispute	in	2015,	law	enforcement	 is	 continuing	 its	 search	 for	 an	 answer	 to	 the	 “going	 dark”	 problem.	Although	“going	dark”	is	an	issue	that	seems	to	affect	all	levels	of	nation	security,	the	FBI	 has	 been	 the	 leading	 voice	 with	 James	 Comey,	 in	 particular,	 in	 urging	 tech	corporations,	Congress	and	 the	public	 to	help	tackle	 this	 issue.	To	be	 clear,	 James	Comey	asserts	his	appreciate	the	importance	of	strong	encryption.	He	called	strong	encryption	“a	key	tool	to	secure	commerce	and	trade,	safeguard	private	information,	promote	 free	 expression	 and	 association,	 and	 strengthen	 cyber	 security”	 and	 said	that	 the	FBI	supports	and	encourages	secure	networks	to	prevent	cyber	threats	 to	the	national	critical	 infrastructure,	 intellectual	property,	and	private	data.30	But	he	also	 explained	 that	 “the	 benefits	 of	 our	 increasingly	 digital	 lives	 have	 been	accompanied	by	new	dangers,	and	we	have	been	forced	to	consider	how	criminals	and	 terrorists	 might	 use	 advances	 in	 technology	 to	 their	 advantage.”31	Yet,	 he	frequently	 and	 repeatedly	 used	 rhetoric	 such	 as,	 “we	 must	 continue	 the	 current	public	debate.”	Strong	encryption	is	clearly	a	significant	issue	to	the	FBI	director	as	he	continuously	devotes	his	time	and	energy	to	“continuing	the	public	debate”,	but	to	 what	 end?	 Rather	 than	 continuing	 a	 real	 debate,	 perhaps	 it’s	 a	 matter	 of	maintaining	public	awareness	of	 the	threat.	His	goal,	most	 likely,	 is	 to	create	more	cooperation	 between	 the	 tech	 companies	 and	 the	 government,	 by	 including	 the																																																									30	https://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/director-comey-discusses-investigative-challenges-in-light-of-new-methods-of-electronic-communication	31	Ibid.	
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public	(Apple/Google	customers)	in	the	conversation.	The	FBI	director	has	devoted	significant	time	and	energy	into	this	awareness	campaign,	and	it	is	our	job	to	fully	and	 impartially	evaluate	 the	 issue,	 if	 a	policy	 is	 to	be	voted	on	 in	 the	near	 future.	Thus	far,	we	have	discussed	the	technological	issue	related	to	going	dark.	Let	us	now	examine	 the	 more	 political	 inner	 workings	 of	 the	 corporate/government	 affairs,	national	security	and	surveillance.		 Christopher	 Soghoian,	 the	 principal	 technologist	 at	 the	 American	 Civil	Liberties	 Union,	 provides	 an	 interesting	 insight	 on	 the	 historical	 context	 of	 this	debate	in	a	lecture	at	the	International	Forum	on	Cybersecurity.	He	says,	“for	more	than	a	hundred	years	 telephone	companies	have	helped	governments	 to	 spy…	 the	governments	of	major	countries	have	known	that	 for	whoever	they	wanted	to	spy	on,	 they	 could	 just	 ask	 one	 of	 their	 friendly	 telecommunications	 companies”32	because	 more	 many	 of	 these	 years,	 these	 were	 state	 controlled	 entities.	 As	technology	advanced	from	the	telegraph,	to	the	telephone,	to	text	messaging	and	so	on,	 the	 governments	 needs	 followed.	 Soghoian	 explains	 that	 because	 there	was	 a	“friendly”	 relationship	 between	 the	 telephone	 companies	 and	 governments	 “the	telephone	companies	ensured	that	their	products	were	designed	for	surveillance.”33	So	each	time	a	telecommunications	company	offered	a	new	service,	they	made	sure	that	 it	 could	 be	 surveyed	 and	 the	 governments	 could	 request	 access.	 This	 was	framed	 in	 the	 U.S.	 by	 the	 Communications	 Assistance	 to	 Law	 Enforcement	 Act	(CALEA),	 which	 required	 telephone	 companies	 and	 others	 to	 ensure	 that	 their	networks	 could	 be	 wiretapped,	 with	 appropriate	 legal	 process,	 as	 network																																																									32	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kqWn-DF-ln8	(1:45)	33	Ibid	(2:10)	
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technologies	moved	from	analog	to	digital.34	However	as	we	have	observed,	 things	have	changed.	Recently,	Silicon	Valley	tech	companies,	namely	Apple,	have	captured	portions	of	the	communication	market,	by	creating	and	controlling	the	phones	and	computers	 themselves,	 and	 consequently	 have	 obtained	 consumers	communications.			 The	problem	for	governments	is	the	fundamental	difference	in	philosophies	between	these	tech	companies	and	the	telephone	companies	of	 the	past.	Soghoian	notes,	“the	phone	companies	first	and	foremost	see	government	as	a	partner	in	part	because	they’re	so	heavily	regulated	and	licensed	that	they	need	the	government	for	permission	 to	 do	 everything”	 while	 companies	 like	 Apple	 do	 not.	 This	oversimplification	presents	significant	insight	into	the	recent	uproar	on	both	sides,	and	 (along	 with	 the	 9/11	 terrorist	 attack)	 helps	 to	 explain	 the	 governments	revamped	 surveillance	 tools	 as	 well	 as	 their	 estrangement	 from	 major	 tech	companies.	
The	Effects	of	the	Snowden	Revelations			 In	 recent	 years	 we	 have	 witnessed	 an	 advancement	 of	 both	 security	capabilities	 and	 surveillance	 capabilities—making	 it	 possible	 to	 track	 and	 learn	about	 individuals	 on	 a	 mass	 scale.	 These	 efforts	 and	 resources	 have	 not	 been	without	 results,	 however,	 as	 NSA	 director	 Michael	 S.	 Rogers	 says	 that	 over	 50	
																																																								34	Ben	Adida,	Collin	Anderson,	Annie	Anton,	et	al.,	“CALEA	II:	Risks	of	Wiretap	Modifications	to	Endpoints,”	(May	17,	2013). 
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terrorist	 plots	 have	 been	 foiled	 since	 9/11.35	However,	 Former	 NSA	 contractor	Edward	Snowden’s	disclosures	brought	to	light	many	of	the	mass	surveillance	tools	and	techniques	the	government	has	established	since	the	passage	of	the	Patriot	Act	in	 the	 aftermath	 of	 the	 September	 11	 attacks.	 The	 Patriot	 Act	 signed	 into	 law	 by	President	 George	 Bush	 on	 October	 26,	 2001,	 was	 established	 to	 enhance	surveillance	 procedures	 in	 order	 to	 track	 and	 catch	 terrorists.	 Other	 subsequent	national	 security	acts	 followed	such	as	 the	PRECISE	Act	 and	 the	FISA	Amendment	Act’s	PRISM	surveillance	program.	Moreover,	an	additional	surveillance	agency	was	created	in	2002:	the	United	States	Department	of	Homeland	Security.	In	2016,	this	agency	alone	was	 allocated	a	net	discretionary	budget	of	 $41.2	billion.36	Since	 the	signing	of	the	Patriot	Act	15	years	ago,	Snowden	revealed	a	number	of	procedures	and	 tools	 developed	 by	 the	 NSA,	 in	 particular,	 which	 have	 resulted	 in	 mass	surveillance	amplifications.	Here	are	some	of	 the	most	significant	revelations	 from	Snowden’s	leak:	
1) MetaData:	His	report	revealed	that	a	secret	court	order	requires	Verizon	to	give	the	 NSA	 the	 phone	 numbers,	 duration	 time,	 routing	 information	 and	 other	details	for	any	calls	made	within	the	United	States	or	between	the	United	States	and	other	countries	(however,	it	does	not	require	Verizon	to	provide	a	record	of	actual	conversations).37	This	revelation	is	still	one	of	the	most	controversial,	and	
																																																								35	http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/nsa-director-50-potential-terrorist-attacks-thwarted-controversial/story?id=19428148	36	https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/FY_2016_DHS_Budget_in_Brief.pdf	37	https://www.theguardian.com/world/interactive/2013/jun/06/verizon-telephone-data-court-order	
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the	legality	of	these	request	are	still	being	questioned.	Moreover,	Verizon	is	not	alone;	AT&T	and	Sprint	received	similar	court	orders	as	well	as	many	credit	card	companies.38	
2) PRISM:	Under	section	702	of	the	FISA	Amendments	Act	of	2008,	PRISM	requests	at	 least	nine	major	 Internet	companies	to	 turn	over	any	data	that	match	court-approved	 search	 terms.	39	The	 NSA	 can	 use	 these	 PRISM	 requests	 to	 target	communications	that	were	encrypted	when	they	traveled	across	the	Internet,	to	focus	on	stored	data	that	telecommunications	filtering	systems	discarded	earlier,	and	 to	 get	 data	 that	 is	 easier	 to	 handle.40	A	 Google	 spokesperson	 told	 the	
Guardian	that,	"Google	does	not	have	a	back	door	for	the	government	to	access	private	user	data.”41	Snowden’s	report	indicated	that	PRISM	is	“the	number	one	source	of	raw	intelligence	used	for	NSA	analytic	reports.”42	
3) GCHQ:	 The	 British	 spy	 agency	 taps	 fiber	 optic	 cables	 all	 over	 the	 world	 to	intercept	data	flowing	through	the	global	Internet.	The	GCHQ	works	closely	with	the	NSA	sharing	data	in	a	classified	program	codenamed	“Tempora”.43	
																																																								38	https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/06/nsa-phone-records-verizon-court-order		39	Barton	Gellman	&	Ashkan	Soltani	(30	October	2013).	"NSA	infiltrates	links	to	Yahoo,	Google	data	centers	worldwide,	Snowden	documents	say".	The	Washington	Post.	Retrieved	October	31,	2013.	40	Siobhan	Gorman	&	Jennifer	Valentiono-Devries	(20	August	2013).	"New	Details	Show	Broader	NSA	Surveillance	Reach	-	Programs	Cover	75%	of	Nation's	Traffic,	Can	Snare	Emails".	The	Wall	Street	Journal.	Retrieved	August	21,	2013.	41	http://mashable.com/2013/06/06/prism-tech-companies-data-mining/#dmoEVODopZqA	42	Staff	(June	6,	2013).	"NSA	Slides	Explain	the	PRISM	Data-Collection	Program".	The	Washington	Post.	Retrieved	June	15,	2013.	43	https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2013/jun/21/gchq-cables-secret-world-communications-nsa?CMP=twt_fd	
	 40	
4) XKeyscore:	is	a	tool	the	NSA	uses	to	search	“nearly	everything	a	user	does	on	the	Internet”	 through	 data	 intercepted	 across	 the	 world.	 In	 Snowden’s	 leaked	documents	 the	 NSA	 describes	 it	 as	 the	 “widest-reaching”	 system	 to	 search	through	Internet	data.44	Xkeyscore	operates	in	over	700	serves	worldwide.	
5) Tailored	Access	Operations	 (TAO):	When	the	surveillance	tactics	listed	above	fail	 to	 provide	 adequate	 information,	 the	 NSA	 uses	 a	 hacker	 team	 codenamed	“Tailored	 Access	 Operations”	 to	 infect	 targeted	 computers	 worldwide	 with	malware.	Snowden’s	leak	revealed	that	over	50,000	computers	have	been	hacked	worldwide.45	
6) NSA	 Tapped	 Yahoo	 and	 Google	 Data	 Centers:	 The	NSA	broke	 into	 the	main	communications	 links	 that	 connect	 Yahoo	 and	 Google	 data	 centers	 around	 the	world.	According	to	Snowden’s	report,	the	agency	has	positioned	itself	to	collect	at	will	 from	hundreds	 of	millions	 of	 user	 accounts,	many	 of	 them	belonging	 to	Americans.	The	NSA	uses	a	 tool	called	MUSCULAR,	 in	a	 joint	operation	with	the	British	agency	GCHQ	to	copy	entire	data	flows	across	fiber-optic	cables	that	carry	information	among	the	data	centers	of	Yahoo	and	Google.46	Interestingly,	the	NSA	
																																																								44See	Snowden, Edward, “XKeyscore”, xkeyscore@nsa, February 25, 2008. Accessed on 
November 8, 2016. https://edwardsnowden.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/2008-
xkeyscore-presentation.pdf 45	See	Derix, Steven. “NSA Infected 50,000 Computer Networks with Malicious 
Software”, nrc.nl: November 2013. Accessed January 14, 
2017.https://www.nrc.nl/nieuws/2013/11/23/nsa-infected-50000-computer-networks-with-malicious-software-a1429487	46	https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nsa-infiltrates-links-to-yahoo-google-data-centers-worldwide-snowden-documents-say/2013/10/30/e51d661e-4166-11e3-8b74-d89d714ca4dd_story.html?utm_term=.5055f16c5db6	
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was	 already	 requiring	 gaining	 access	 to	 Yahoo	 and	 Google	 through	 the	undisclosed	PRISM	program.	
7) DISHFIRE:	 Through	 this	 program,	 the	 NSA	 was	 collecting	 200	 million	 text	messages	per	day.	The	agency	described	this	method	as	a	“goldmine	to	exploit”	for	all	 kinds	of	personal	data.47	According	 to	 the	Guardian	 article,	 the	NSA	uses	these	 messages	 to	 extract	 the	 senders'	 and	 recipients'	 personal	 data	 such	 as	location	information,	financial	activity	and	contact	details.48	
About	a	year	and	a	half	after	these	disclosures,	Apple	developed	iOS	8	with	default	encryption	 of	 the	 password-protected	 contents	 of	 its	 devices	 in	 the	 mobile	operating	systems.49	This	operating	system	encrypts	 the	data	stored	 locally	on	the	phone,	 in	 transit,	 and	 stored	on	Apple’s	 servers.50	Google	 quickly	 followed	suit	 by	announcing	 Lollipop,	 its	 next	 version	 of	 Android	 OS.	 This	 new	 operating	 system	would	 also	 enable	 encryption	 by	 default.51	A	 few	 months	 later,	 WhatsApp,	 the	popular	 free	 instant	 messaging	 application	 for	 smartphones—now	 owned	 by	Facebook—announced	 it	 would	 implement	 TextSecure,	 an	 end-to-end	 encryption	
																																																								47	See	Ball, James. “NSA collects millions of text messages daily in ‘untargeted global sweep” 
The Guardian: January 16, 2014. Accessed on November 23, 2016.	48	Ibid.	49	See	Sanger,	David.	“Signaling	Post-Snowden	Era,	New	iPhone	Locks	Out	NSA,”	The	New	York	Times,	September	26,	2014,		50	Apple,	Inc.,	“iOS	Security	Guide:	iOS	8.1	or	later,”	October	2014	51	Timberg,	Craig.	“Newest	Androids	will	join	iPhones	in	offering	default	encryption,	blocking	police,”	The	Washington	Post,	September	18,	2015,	http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2014/09/18/newestandroids-will-join-iphones-in-offering-default-encryption-blocking-police/.	
	 42	
software.52	In	 March	 of	 2015,	 Yahoo	 developed	 source	 code	 for	 Yahoo	 Mail	 that	encrypts	messages.53	What	we	are	seeing	is	an	unrelenting	technological	arms	race.	 Moreover,	in	June	2015	the	United	States	Senate	approved	the	USA	Freedom	Act,	 which	 reformed	 several	 provisions	 of	 the	 Patriot	 Act	 from	 2002.54	The	 Act	imposed	some	limits	on	the	bulk	collection	of	telecommunication	metadata	on	U.S.	citizens	by	the	NSA.	According	to	Jameel	Jaffer	of	the	American	Civil	Liberties	Union,	“This	is	the	most	important	surveillance	reform	bill	since	1978,	and	its	passage	is	an	indication	 that	Americans	are	no	 longer	willing	 to	give	 the	 intelligence	agencies	a	blank	check.	It’s	a	testament	to	the	significance	of	the	Snowden	disclosures	and	also	to	the	hard	work	of	many	principled	legislators	on	both	sides	of	the	aisle.”55			 By	amending	section	215,	 the	USA	Freedom	Act	required	the	phone	data	to	remain	with	 the	 telecommunications	 companies,	 rather	 than	 directly	 by	 the	 NSA.	The	 NSA	 would	 have	 to	 go	 to	 the	 FISC	 (Foreign	 Intelligence	 Surveillance	 Court)	court	to	get	access.		The	government	would	argue	that	by	not	directly	holding	large	sums	of	data	themselves,	this	does	not	amount	to	mass	surveillance.	Moreover,	even	when	 they	did	hold	all	 of	 the	data	 themselves,	 the	government	 claims	 they	would	only	 access	 it	 for	 targeted	 searches.	 Even	 so,	 that	 much	 data	 appears	 to	 be	 an	imbalance	of	power	at	their	fingertips.	Nevertheless,	these	provisions	only	apply	to																																																									52	See	Greenberg,	Andy.	“WhatsApp	Just	Switched	on	End-to-End	Encryption	for	Hundreds	of	Millions	of	Users,”	WIRED,	November	18,	2014,	http://www.wired.com/2014/11/whatsapp-encrypted-messaging/.	53	See	Stamos,	Alex.	“User-Focused	Security:	End-to-End	Encryption	Extension	for	Yahoo	Mail,”	Yahoo	Blog,	March	15,	2015,		54	https://www.congress.gov/bill/107th-congress/house-bill/3162	55	See	Siddiqui,	Sabrina.	“Congress	Passes	Surveillance	reform	in	vindication	for	Snowden”	https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/jun/02/congress-surveillance-reform-edward-snowden	
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phone	records.	The	NSA	can	continue	to	collect	bulk	data	 from	the	Internet.	56	The	Act	preserves	“the	intelligence	community's	ability	to	gather	information	in	a	more	focused	way”57	as	we	have	examined	above.			 In	 conclusion,	 Snowden’s	 disclosures	 revealed	 disturbing	 truths	 about	 U.S.	and	foreign	government	mass	surveillance	programs.	Some	efforts	have	been	made	to	push	back	on	this	apparent	overreach	of	powers,	however	to	a	 large	extent,	 the	NSA’s	 surveillance	 capabilities	 remain	 intact.	 On	 metadata,	 there	 is	 reasonable	debate	on	the	extent	to	which	it	assists	in	law	enforcement	criminal	investigations.	From	a	local	or	state	law	enforcement	perspective,	claims	that	it	is	not	sufficient	in	solving	 criminal	 cases	 seem	 quiet	 plausible,	 whoever,	 for	 the	 FBI’s	 or	 NSA’s	purposes	it	seems	more	useful.	Nevertheless,	it	is	not	possible	to	encrypt	Metadata,	and	 therefore,	 useful	 or	 not,	 ethical	 or	 not,	 it	 will	 always	 be	 available	 to	 aid	 law	enforcement	 agencies	 in	 their	 efforts	 to	 effectively	 solve	 case	 and	 appropriately	serve	justice.			
Chapter	3:	Alternative	Solutions	to	Required	Exceptional	Access		 Although	the	landscape	seems	to	be	changing	 in	 favor	of	privacy	advocates,	the	 government	 still	maintains	 the	 ability	 to	use	 and	 improve	many	 sophisticated	surveillance	 tools	 and	 procedures.	 Although,	 these	 methods	 alarm	 privacy	advocates,	 relying	 on	 surveillance	 technology	 may	 be	 one	 preferable	 solution	 to	combating	 going	 dark	 that	 does	 not	 weaken	 existing	 security	 infrastructure	 by																																																									56	Granick,	Jennifer.	"NSA's	Creative	Interpretations	Of	Law	Subvert	Congress	And	The	Rule	Of	Law".	Forbes.	18	January	2014.	57	Leahy,	Sen.	Patrick;	Sensenbrenner,	Rep.	Jim	(29	October	2013).	"The	case	for	NSA	reform".	Politico.	18	January	2014.	
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decryption.	 	A	recent	 landmark	Harvard	study,	 “Don’t	Panic”,	argues	that	although	the	 use	 of	 encryption	 may	 present	 a	 barrier	 to	 surveillance,	 it	 may	 not	 be	impermeable.	 There	 are	 many	 ways	 to	 implement	 encryption	 incorrectly.	 This	research	claims	that	Encryption	typically	does	not	protect	metadata,	such	as	e-mail	addresses	and	mobile	device	location	information	that	“must	remain	in	plaintext	to	serve	a	 functional	purpose.”	Moreover,	 “Data	 can	also	be	 leaked	 into	unencrypted	media,	 through	cloud	backups	and	syncing	across	multiple	devices”	 (Olsen	9).	We	will	 see	 how	 these	 weaknesses	 are,	 or	 ought	 be,	 exploited	 and	 utilized	 by	 law	enforcement.			 On	 privacy,	 there	 have	 and	will	 always	 be	 pockets	 of	 communications	 that	are	out	of	reach	of	surveillance.	However,	more	than	ever	before	areas	are	becoming	increasingly	illuminated.	Before	the	digital	age,	it	seems	evidence	of	a	crime	was	just	as	difficult	to	come	by.	Consider	the	case	of	assault.	If	someone	murders	someone	in	public,	and	a	 third-party	witnesses	the	act	 from	a	distance,	what	 information	does	law	 enforcement	 have	 to	 convict	 the	 criminal,	 other	 than	 a	 rough	 physical	description?	 Today,	 regardless	 of	 whether	 or	 not	 metadata	 provides	 enough	information	 to	 convict	 a	 suspect,	 there	 are	 surveillance	 cameras	 on	 nearly	 every	block!	Even	as	encryption	blocks	government	access	to	phone	data,	we	live	our	lives	more	on	our	devices	and	on	 the	 Internet	 than	we	have	 could	have	before.	Even	 if	this	information	is	protected	by	software,	it	is	nevertheless	information	that	did	not	exist	before	the	digital	age.	As	technology	has	progressed,	there	are	those	who	have	and	will	 continue	 to	 exploit	 it	 to	 conceal	 nefarious	 actions.	However,	many	 argue	
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that	claiming	we	have	more	privacy	than	in	the	past	is	an	inaccurate	depiction	of	the	technological	landscape.		 On	this	note,	the	proliferation	of	surveillance	cameras—although	tangentially	connected	 to	 this	 debate—are	 peculiarly	 not	 openly	 criticized	 by	 many	 privacy	advocates.	 Perhaps	 this	 form	 of	 surveillance	 is	 being	 overshadowed	 by	 the	more	surreptitious	methods	described	above.	Nevertheless,	 you	don’t	often	hear	people	making	a	fuss	about	the	surveillance	camera	at	the	traffic	light,	in	the	convenience	store,	or	on	the	city	block.	Why	is	that?	In	all	likelihood	they	will	grow	coverage	and	dependability.	 Perhaps	 it	 is	 because	 of	 the	 distance	 between	 the	 viewer	 and	 the	suveilled.	 	The	 surveillance	 captures	you	at	 a	distance;	 it	doesn’t	necessarily	 track	you	(yet)	or	read	you	messages.	But,	 if	well	connected,	networks	of	cameras	could	track	your	day;	from	everywhere	you	go	outside	of	your	home.	And	yet,	today	they	don’t	seem	to	have	the	power	to	be	abused	the	way	metadata,	for	instance,	can	be.	Surveillance	cameras	capture	robbers,	traffic	light	runners,	or	traffic	collisions.	They	are	only	employed	after	an	event	has	occurred,	rather	than	before	or	during.	 	Still,	the	American	 Civil	 Liberties	Union	 (ACLU)	 deplores	 their	 proliferation	 and	warns	against	 possible	 abuses.58	They	 argue	 that	 studies	 show	 the	 camera	 don’t	 act	 as	 a	deterrent	 to	crime	(although	I	believe	they	are	 in	place	to	collect	evidence	than	to	deter)	and	that	crime	rates	have	not	decreased	as	they	have	become	more	prevalent.	Nevertheless,	 video	 surveillance	has	proven	 to	be	useful	 in	not	merely	petty	 theft	crimes	or	traffic	accidents,	but	even	in	national	security	threats.	Video	surveillance																																																									58	See	American	Civil	Liberties	Union,	“	What’s	Wrong	with	Public	Video	Surveillance”,	Accessed	on	February	12,	2017.	https://www.aclu.org/other/whats-wrong-public-video-surveillance	
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spotted	the	suspects	 in	 the	Boston	Marathon	bombings	(2013),59	helped	pin	down	terrorists	who	carried	out	the	London	bombings	(2005),60	and	captured	the	Tucson	shooting	(2011).61	When	it	comes	to	the	normative	question	“should	we	allow	bulk	data	 collection?”	 surveillance	 cameras	 appear	 useful,	 and	 unlikely	 to	 go	 away	anytime	soon.		
A	Deeper	Look	into	Government	Mass	Surveillance			 You	may	be	 thinking,	 “If	 I	 am	not	doing	anything	 illegal,	why	 should	 I	 care	about	the	government	using	mass	surveillance?”	There	are	many	of	those	who	live	straightforward	lives	who	believe	there	to	be	no	reason	the	government	should	or	would	 be	 targeting	 them.	 Because	 they	 have	 nothing	 to	 hide,	 when	 government	agencies	such	as	 the	NSA	secretly	gain	more	powers,	 it	means	 little	 to	 them.	They	know	NSA	is	just	trying	to	track	and	catch	terrorist	plotting	against	the	United	States	of	America.	Since	the	vast	majority	of	American	citizens	are	not	terrorists,	why	were	the	Snowden	revelations	so	disconcerting?	In	other	words,	what	is	problematic	for	government	surveillance	agencies	gaining	more	power?			 A	number	of	instances	in	the	last	century,	in	which	United	States	government	powers	 were	 abused,	 proved	 to	 be	 both	 unconstitutional	 and	 harmful	 to	 United	States	 citizens.	 Significant	 examples	 that	 best	 demonstrate	 these	 trends	 are																																																									59	See	http://www.geekwire.com/2013/security-cameras-helped-catch-boston-marathon-bombers-public-surveillance/	60	McVeigh, Karen. “How CCTV helped snare failed terrorists”, The Guardian: July 10, 
2007. Accessed on March 5, 2017.	61See	Ovide Shira.”Skype Social media Accounts Hacked by Syrian Electronic 
Army”, Wall Street Journal: January 1, 2014. Accessed August 4, 2016. 
https://blogs.wsj.com/digits/2014/01/01/skype-social-media-accounts-hacked-by-sea/	
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illustrated	by	the	events	that	occurred	during	the	Red	Scare.	The	McCarthyism	era	was	dominated	by	fears	and	anxieties	about	Soviet	espionage	and	radical	anarchism.	Certain	 prominent	 cases	 stand	 out	 in	 history	 such	 as	 Yates	 v.	 United	 States62	and	
Watkins	v.	United	States.63	In	both	cases	are	examples	where	United	States	citizens	were	charged	with	crimes,	later	to	be	overturned	by	U.S.	Supreme	Court	decision.			 It	is	difficult	to	find	precise	number	of	victims	affected	by	the	anti-communist	investigations.	It	is	estimated	that	the	number	imprisoned	is	in	the	hundreds,	while	ten	to	twelve	thousand	 lost	 their	 jobs.	 In	many	cases,	simply	being	subpoenaed	by	the	House	Un-American	Activities	Committee	(HUAC)	was	enough	to	be	fired.		 During	this	period,	FBI	director	J.	Edgar	Hoover	designed	President	Truman’s	loyalty-security	 program,	 in	 which	 FBI	 agents	 investigated	 the	 backgrounds	 of	countless	employees.	The	scale	of	such	an	assignment	demanded	the	expansion	of	the	 Bureau	 to	 double	 in	 size	 from	 1946	 to	 1952	 (Weiner	 211). “When	 the	 dust	cleared,	 maybe	 1	 in	 10	 was	 found	 guilty	 of	 a	 deportable	 offense,”	 says	 Weiner.	“Hoover	denied	—	at	the	time	and	until	his	death	—	that	he	had	been	the	intellectual	author	of	the	Red	Raids”(Weiner	211).		 	As	 the	 anti-communist	 movement	 grew	 it	 expanded	 to	 included	homosexuality,	 and	 was	 termed	 the	 “Lavender	 scare”.	 Widely	 spread	 FBI	surveillance	 was	 established	 intended	 to	 identify	 homosexual	 government	employees.64	The	hunt	for	homosexuals,	who	were	presumed	to	be	“subversive”	by	
																																																								62	Yates	v.	United	States,	354	U.S.	298	(1957)	63	WATKINS	v.	UNITED	STATES,	(1957)	No.	261	Argued:	March	7,	1957	64	D'Emilio,	John	and	Freedman,	Estelle.	“Intimate	Matters:	A	History	of	Sexuality	in	America”,	Third	Edition.	(Chicago:	University	of	Chicago	Press,	2012.),	p.	316	
	 48	
nature,	 resulted	 in	 thousands	 being	 harassed	 and	 denied	 employment.65	Hoover	conflated—and	he	was	 not	 alone—communism	with	homosexuality.	 Interestingly,	“Both	communists	and	homosexuals	had	secret	coded	 language	that	 they	spoke	to	each	other,	and	they	had	clandestine	lives,	they	met	in	clandestine	places,	they	had	secrets.”66	Says	Tim	Weiner,	a	Pulitzer	Prize	winner	and	New	York	Times	reporter.67		 The	FBI	surveillance	efforts	didn’t	stop	there.	Hoover	also	saw	the	anti-war	protestors	and	civil	rights	leaders	as	“subversives”.	Tim	Weiner	explains	that	these	people	were	enemies	of	the	state	(Martin	Luther	King	Jr.	 in	particular.	Hoover	was	determined	 to	 surveil	 King	 by	 planting	 bugs	 around	 civil	 rights	 leaders	 (thinking	communists	had	infiltrated	the	civil	rights	movement).	“Hoover	had	his	intelligence	chief	bugged	King’s	bedroom,	and	then	sent	the	civil	rights	leader	a	copy	of	the	sex	recordings	his	 intelligence	 chief…	 and	 sent	 [the	 tapes]	 to	 colleges	 to	 keep	 him	off	campus”	Weiner	says.68	He	continues	to	explain	how,	“[Edgar]	decided	up	to	a	point	...	where	the	boundaries	of	the	law	[were]	when	it	came	to	black	bag	jobs,	break-ins,	bugging,	 surveillance,	 the	 constitutionality	 of	 gathering	 secret	 intelligence	 on	America's	enemies	—	both	real	and	imagined.”			 Moreover,	 there	 have	 been	 numerous	 abuses	 of	 power	 in	 the	 past	 decade.	Along	with	the	exploitations	of	the	Patriot	Act	discussed	previously,	the	No-Fly	List	(a	 list	 to	 track	people	 the	government	prohibits	 form	 traveling	because	 they	have	
																																																								65	Ibid.	p.	316	66	See	Weiner, Tim. “The History of the FBI’s Secret ‘Enemies’ List” NRP: heard on Fresh Air. 
February 14, 2012. Accessed on March 13, 2017. 67	Interestingly,	many	historians	argue	and	speculate	that	J.	Edgar	Hoover	was,	in	fact,	a	homosexual:	Terry,	Jennifer.	“An	American	Obsession:	Science,	Medicine,	and	Homosexuality	in	Modern	Society”.	University	of	Chicago	Press.	(1999)	p.	350	68	Weiner,	Tim.	
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been	 labeled	 as	 security	 risks)	 is	 of	 growing	 controversy.	 There	 are	 more	 than	47,000	 names	 as	 of	 2013.69	The	 American	 Civil	 Liberties	 Union	 (ACLU)	 has	 long	criticized	the	No	Fly	List	and	similar	lists	on	the	asserting	that	the	government	has	not	provided	a	constitutionally	adequate	means	of	allowing	individuals	to	challenge	their	 inclusion	on	 the	 list.	The	ACLU	states	 that	 “constitutional	 rights	are	at	 stake	when	the	government	stigmatizes	Americans	as	suspected	terrorists	and	bans	them	from	international	 travel.70	The	 list	is	known	for	making	errors,	most	notably	with	Senator	Ted	Kennedy,	who	was	flagged	trying	to	fly	from	Boston	to	Washington.71			 Although	 much	 has	 changed	 in	 the	 past	 century,	 private	 citizens	 and	government	officials	alike	are	facing	new	fears	today	in	regards	to	extreme	Islamic	terrorism	 and	 immigration.	 In	 a	 panel	 discussion	 here	 at	 the	 University	 of	 Texas,	Christopher	 Soghoian	 argues	 that	 the	 government’s	 problem	 with	 widespread	encryption	 for	 private	 use	 is	 really	 about	 new	 people	 having	 access	 to	communications	security	(where	as	FBI,	presidents,	and	law	enforcement	agencies	have	been	using	encrypted	phones	for	decades).72	He	views	the	issue	not	only	as	a	problem	for	privacy	advocates	(like	himself)	but	also	has	a	problem	of	equality	and	racial	justice.	He	says,	“I	view	[going	dark]	as	a	hand	ringing	of	those	in	power,	who	have	long	had	encryption,	who	are	upset	that	those	without	power	are	about	to	get	encryption…	I	think	we	should	have	an	honest	conversation	and	say	this	is	not	new	people	having	access	to	communications	security	because	the	FBI	directors’	had	an																																																									69	See	http://www.foxnews.com/travel/2015/09/09/8-ways-can-end-up-on-no-fly-list.html	70	Seehttps://www.aclu.org/issues/national-security/privacy-and-surveillance/watchlists	71	See	http://www.factcheck.org/2015/12/ted-kennedy-and-the-no-fly-list-myth/	72	Soghoian,	Christopher.	Session	1:	The	"Going	Dark"	Encryption	Debate.	Robert	Strauss	Center.	Feb	12,	2016	<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=B_7CWSgr1Vg>	
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encrypted	phone	for	decades,	the	presidents’	had	encrypted	phone	for	decades,	and			law	enforcement	over	the	last	 ten	years	have	been	 increasingly	moving	 from	open	air	radio	communications	to	encrypted	radios.	 I	view	this	as	a	problem	of	equality	and	 racial	 justice,	 which	 isn’t	 apart	 of	 the	 current	 debate.”	 Soghoian	 is	 a	 strong	privacy	advocate	and	definitely	on	the	far	side	of	that	of	the	spectrum.	At	moments	he	may	seem	overzealous	about	the	importance	of	strong	encryption,	but	I	think	he	raises	 a	 very	 interesting	 point	 here	 about	 the	 purpose	 of	 surveillance	 in	 law	enforcement.	He	claims	that	African	Americans	and	Muslims,	 in	particular,	are	the	most	 surveilled	 groups	 of	 people	 in	 the	 United	 States,	 and	 raises	 questions	regarding	 the	 true	 extent	 to	 the	 government’s	 fears	 of	 going	 dark.	 It	 is	 worth	keeping	 in	 mind	 as	 we	 are	 dealing	 with	 issuing	 of	 border	 control,	 refugees,	 and	immigration	today	(which	are	becoming	more	and	more,	I	believe,	evocative	of	the	Hoover	era.		 Many	 experts	 argue	 the	metaphor	 “going	 dark”	 is	misleading	 and	 does	 not	accurately	 depict	 the	 world	 we	 are	 living	 in.	 They	 claim,	 in	 actually,	 the	 digital	landscape	 is	 “going	bright”	because	we	are—as	privacy	 law	professor	Peter	Swire	terms—	in	“the	golden	age	of	surveillance.”73	Not	only	have	we	seen	United	States	government	 agencies	 create	 and	 expand	 their	 surveillance	 programs	 in	 the	 last	decade,	 but	 like	 all	 technology,	 surveillance	 technology	 has	 before	 cheaper	 and	more	readily	available.	One	great	example	of	this	is	the	IMSI-catcher,	also	known	as	a	StingRay,	which	tracks	and	intercepts	telecommunications.	You	might	recognize	it	from	that	police	scene	in	any	movie,	ever.	As	Christopher	Soghoian	elucidates,	“Your																																																									73	Peter	Swire	and	Kenesa	Ahmad,	“‘Going	Dark’	Versus	a	Golden	Age	of	Surveillance,”	Center	for	Democracy	&	Technology,	November	28,	2011.	
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cell	 phone	 is	 not	 secure.	 If	 you	 make	 a	 telephone	 call	 today,	 someone	 standing	outside	your	house	with	about	$500	worth	of	hardware	can	 listen	to	your	calls.”74	This	could	be	a	police	department,	a	stalker,	a	criminal,	a	foreign	government,	or	a	competitor	of	yours	seeking	to	get	information.	He	continues	to	explain	this	has	how	it	has	been	for	more	that	20	years,	and	the	government	was	initially	the	only	party	capable	 of	 this	 type	 of	 “wiretapping”.	 However,	 today—as	 costs	 of	 technologies	drop—	 “we	 have	 truly	 democratized	 surveillance	 capabilities	 where	 anyone	 can	either	go	onto	Alibaba	(a	Chinese	equivalent	of	EBay)	and	by	a	StingRay	for	$2000	off	 the	 shelf,	 or	 build	 one	 themselves”.75	In	 this	 chapter	 we	 will	 continue	 our	discussion	 of	 government	 surveillance	 in	 regards	 to	 solutions	 that	 do	 not	 require	any	decryption	or	weakening	of	current	security	systems.	
The	Internet	of	Things		
	 Everyday	objects	are	increasingly	becoming	embedded	with	technology	that	connects	 it	 to	networked	servers	(the	Internet)	 in	what	 is	becoming	known	as	the	Internet	of	Things	(IoT).	According	to	expert	observers	“the	Internet	of	Things	has	the	potential	to	fundamentally	shift	the	way	we	interact	with	our	surrounding”	(Olsen	13).	This	would	include	at	home,	at	work,	in	our	cars,	in	shopping	 centers,	 and	 on	 public	 streets.	 Moreover,	 the	 “IoT	 market	 is	forecast	to	grow	into	a	multitrillion	dollar	industry	within	the	next	ten	years”	(Olsen	 13).	 This	will	 significantly	 change	 how	members	 of	 society	 interact																																																									74	See	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=B_7CWSgr1Vg	19:45	75	Ibid.	
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with	each	other	and	the	objects	and	devices	around	them.	To	paint	a	picture,	IoT	appliances	and	products	 can	be	 “televisions	and	 toasters	 to	bed	sheets,	light	 bulbs,	 cameras,	 toothbrushes,	 door	 locks,	 cars,	 watches,	 and	 other	wearables.”	 All	 of	 these	 objects	 can	 and	 will	 be	 packed	 with	 wireless	technology	 that	 will	 connect	 to	 the	 Internet	 (Olsen	 13).	 This	 emerging	market	of	objects	will	not	only	revolutionize	the	computing	industry,	but	will	also	 create	 prime	 mechanisms	 for	 surveillance—“	 alternative	 vectors	 for	information-gathering	that	could	more	than	fill	many	of	the	gaps	left	behind	by	 sources	 that	 have	 gone	 dark	 –	 so	 much	 so	 that	 they	 raise	 troubling	questions	about	how	exposed	to	eavesdropping	the	general	public	is	poised	to	become”	(Olsen	12).		 A	 number	 of	 companies	 are	 developing	 business	 strategies	 and	 products.	Phillips,	 GE,	 Amazon,	 Apple,	 Google,	 Microsoft,	 Tesla,	 Samsung,	 and	 Nike	 are	 all	working	 on	 products	 embedded	 with	 IoT	 technology.	 These	 devices	 include	microphones,	 speakers,	 accelerometers,	 magnetometers,	 proximity	 sensors,	barometers,	 infrared	 sensors,	 and	 fingerprint	 readers	 to	 name	 a	 few.	 A	 familiar	example	 of	 an	 IoT	 that	 has	 existed	 for	 decades	 is	OnStar:	 a	 subsidiary	 of	 General	Motors	that	provides	communications,	navigation,	and	remote	diagnostics	systems.	These	devices	will	all	be	connect	and	communicate	with	each	other,	and	with	their	respective	 retailer	 cloud	 servers. 76 	These	 new	 technologies	 will	 provide	 law	
																																																								76	See	David	Linthicum,	“Thank	the	cloud	for	making	big	data	and	IoT	possible,”	InfoWorld,	January	16,	2015,	http://www.infoworld.com/article/2867978/cloud-computing/thank-the-cloud-for-making-big-data-and-internetof-things-possible.html.	
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enforcement	with	 additional	 information	 and	 evidence	 as	 they	 become	more	 and	more	unavoidable.			 For	example,	 Samsung	has	developed	smart	TVs	built	with	voice	 command	capabilities	since	2015.	Samsung’s	privacy	policy	instructs	users	to	“be	aware	that	if	your	 spoken	 words	 include	 personal	 or	 other	 sensitive	 information,	 that	information	 will	 be	 among	 the	 data	 captured	 and	 transmitted	 to	 a	 third	 party	through	 you	 use	 of	 the	 Voice	 Recognition.” 77 	Because	 voice	 recognition	 is	 a	“computationally	 intensive	 task”,	 the	 processing	 power	 demanded	 for	 this	 task	 is	too	 great	 for	 modern	 television	 technology,	 so	 these	 companies	 utilize	 cloud	infrastructure	 through	 a	 network	 connection	 to	 send	 the	 voice	 data	 to	 a	 remote	serve	to	process,	interpret,	and	relay	data	back	to	the	television	(Olsen	14).	Simple	voice	 commands	 such	 as,	 “go	 to	 channel	 52”	 can	 be	 computed	 by	 the	 television.	However,	 more	 complex	 voice	 commands	 are	 required	 to	 be	 sent	 to	 Samsung’s	servers.			 As	a	 result,	 law	enforcement	or	 intelligence	agencies	 could	start	 to	 request	Samsung,	 and	 similar	 companies	 of	 networked	 devices,	 to	 hand	 over	 data	 with	legally	 obtained	 warrants,	 or	 even	 “push	 an	 update	 or	 flip	 a	 digital	 switch	 to	intercept	 the	ambient	communications	of	a	 target”	(Olsen	14).	 If	 these	predictions	are	as	accurate	as	they	appear,	the	Internet	of	Things	will	continue	to	create	a	world	of	information	law	enforcement	can	use.	This	example	isn’t	necessarily	the	answer	to	the	going	dark	problem.	 It	 is	meant	 to	provide	a	viable	alternative	path	 for	 law	
																																																								77	See	Samsung,	“Samsung	Privacy	Policy	–	SmartTV	Supplement,”	http://www.samsung.com/sg/info/privacy/smarttv.html	(accessed	October	26,	2015).	
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enforcement	 to	 pursue,	 which	 isn’t	 mandating	 access	 to	 telecommunication	companies.		
	
Lawful	Hacking	Solution	as	an	Alternative	Solution	
	As	we	have	 seen	over	 the	past	decade,	 the	FBI	 is	not	only	 interested	 in	accessing	communication	 devices,	 they	 are	 also	 concerned	 with	 accessing	 communication	networks.	 Valerie	 Caproni,	 General	 Counsel	 of	 the	 FBI,	 said	 in	 a	 Congressional	testimony:		Methods	 of	 accessing	 communications	 networks	 have	 similarly	 grown	 in	variety	 and	 complexity.	 Recent	 innovations	 in	 hand-held	 devices	 have	changed	the	ways	 in	which	consumers	access	networks	and	network-based	services.	 One	 result	 of	 this	 change	 is	 a	 transformation	 of	 communications	services	 from	 a	 straightforward	 relationship	 between	 a	 customer	 and	 a	single	 CALEA-covered	 provider	 (e.g.	 customer	 to	 telephone	 company)	 to	 a	complex	environment	in	which	a	customer	may	use	several	access	methods	to	 maintain	 simultaneous	 interactions	 with	 multiple	 providers,	 some	 of	whom	may	be	based	overseas	or	are	otherwise	outside	the	scope	of	CALEA.	As	a	 result,	 although	 the	government	may	obtain	a	 court	order	authorizing	the	 collection	 of	 certain	 communications,	 it	 often	 serves	 that	 order	 on	 a	provider	who	does	 not	have	 an	 obligation	 under	 CALEA	 to	 be	 prepared	 to	execute	it.	
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	Similar	 to	 the	 evolution	 of	 the	 telecommunication	 industry,	 technology	 has	 had	 a	similar	 effect	 on	 the	 relationship	 between	 the	 government	 and	 Internet	 provides.	Steven	M.	 Bellovin	 explains	 in	 “Lawful	 Hacking:	 Using	 Existing	 Vulnerabilities	 for	Wiretapping	on	the	Internet”,	that	over	the	last	three	decades,	“we	have	moved	from	a	 circuit-switched	 centralized	 communications	 network…run	 by	 a	 monopoly	provider,	to	an	Internet	Protocol	(IP)	base	decentralized	network	run	by	thousands	of	providers”	(Bellovin	5).	This	change	gave	rise	to	the	need	for	the	Communications	Assistance	 for	 Law	 Enforcement	 Act	 (CALEA).	 This	 Act,	 passed	 in	 1994,	 was	designed	 to	 enhance	 the	 ability	 of	 law	 enforcement	 agencies	 to	 conduct	 lawful	interception	 of	 communication	 by	 required	 that	 telecommunications	 carriers	 and	manufactures	 of	 telecommunications	 design	 their	 systems	 with	 built-in	vulnerabilities	 fro	 targeted	 surveillance.	 It	 has	 since	 been	 extended	 to	 cover	broadband	 Internet	 and	 VoIP.78	As	 the	 providers	multiplied,	 and	 communications	become	 encrypted	 end-to-end,	 Bellovin	 explains,	 the	 CALEA’s	 ability	 to	 legally	authorize	 wiretaps	 may	 be	 impeded.	 Similar	 to	 requiring	 access	 to	telecommunication	 devices,	 the	 FBI’s	 preferred	 solution	 is	 “requiring	 that	 social-networking	Web	 sites	 and	 providers	 of	 VoIP,	 instant	 messaging,	 and	Web	 e-mail	alter	their	code	to	ensure	their	products	are	wiretap-friendly”.79		According	to	Steve																																																									78	VoIP	(or	Voice	over	Internet	Protocol)	is	a	technological	method	of	delivering	voice	communications	and	multimedia	over	the	Internet	(IP)	networks.	A	prevalent	example	of	this	technology	is	SKYPE.	79	See	Declan	McCullagh,	FBI:	We	Need	Wiretap-Ready	Web	Sites—Now,	CNET	(May	4,	2012),	http://news.cnet.com/8301-1009_3-57428067-83/fbi-we-need-wiretap-ready-web-sites-now/		
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M	 Bellovin,	 vulnerability	 is	 “a	 weakness	 in	 a	 system	 that	 can	 potentially	 be	manipulated	 by	 an	 unauthorized	 entity	 to	 allow	 exposure	 of	 some	 aspect	 of	 the	system”	 (23).	 Vulnerabilities	 can	 be	 bugs,	 or	 defects,	 in	 the	 code,	 or	misconfigurations,	 such	 as	 not	 changing	 a	 default	 password	 or	 running	 open,	unused	services.	In	addition	he	explains	that	“another	common	type	of	vulnerability	results	 from	not	 correctly	 limiting	 input	 text	 (this	 is	 also	 known	 as	 not	 sanitizing	input)	(23).			 We	 know	 that	 our	 communications	 systems	 today	 are	 under	 attack	 and	require	security	systems	to	ensure	the	protection	of	sensitive	information,	whether	it	is	government,	corporate,	or	personal.	Thus,	mandating	access	points	(also	called	wiretaps)	 on	 communications	 tools	 is	 ostensibly	 an	 opportunity	 for	 increased	exploitation	 by	 the	 enemy.	 Furthermore,	 the	 general	 clandestine	 nature	of	 CALEA	mandates	 increase	 security	 risks.	 As	 Ben	 Adida	 explains	 in	 “CALEA	 II:	 Risks	 of	Wiretap	Modifications	 to	 Endpoints”,	 the	most	 dangerous	 cyber-attacks	 are	 those	“which	not	only	compromise	a	system	but	also	evade	detection.	This	is	precisely	the	objective	 of	 a	 government	 surveillance	 solution”(Adida	 5).	 Thus,	 adding	 wiretap	capabilities	 to	 Internet	 based	 networks	 can	 be	 uniquely	 dangerous	 precisely	because	they	are	designed	to	be	unknown	in	application.	Adida	further	explains	that	“wiretaps	 are	 designed	 to	 be	 kept	 secret	 from	 both	 the	 parties	 involved	 in	 the	communication	and	also	 from	anyone	else	 that	does	not	have	a	 ‘need	 to	know’	 in	order	 to	 execute	 the	 tap”	 (Adida	 5).	 Mandating	 wiretapping	 capabilities	 is	 a	dangerous	solution	because	it	increases	the	possibility	that	a	malicious	hacker	could	
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intercept	communications	with	lower	risk	of	discovery.	In	other	words,	it	would	the	FBI	would	be	opening	doors	for	both	themselves	and	the	enemy.		 There	 are,	 after	 all,	 other	 ways	 of	 ways	 of	 going	 after	 communications	content	 than	 providing	 law	 enforcement	 with	 mandated	 access	 to	 encrypted	communications.	Although	the	majority	of	technology	experts	warn	against	created	any	new	wiretapping	capabilities,	there	are	some	who	suggest	exploiting	those	that	already	 exist	 is	 viable	 solution.	 It	 sounds	 somewhat	 dubious,	 in	 essence,	 as	 it	requires	 law	 enforcement	 agencies	 to	 commit	 the	 same	 actions	 as	 malicious	hackers.	Nevertheless,	 no	 one	 complained	when	 the	 FBI	 broke	 into	 Syed	 Farook’s	(San	Bernardino	terrorist)	phone	with	the	help	of	a	third	party,	as	this	is	essentially	the	 same	 solution	 in	 a	 different	 context.	 Furthermore,	 it	 is	 important	 to	 keep	 in	mind	 that	 in	 doing,	 this	 strategy	would	 be	more	 expensive	 and	 require	more	 and	more	time	and	resources	into	conducting	targeting	seizure	of	evidence.	In	addition,	local	 and	 state	 law	 enforcement	 agencies	 tend	 to	 have	 fewer	 resources	 and	 are	technologically	less	advanced	than	federal	agencies,	and	would	therefore	rely	more	and	 more	 on	 their	 assistance	 into	 criminal	 investigations.	 Nevertheless,	 this	approach	is	a	tradeoff	enabling	the	vast	majority	of	communications	to	remain	and	continue	to	be	secure.		 Another	 simple	 way	 for	 law	 enforcement	 to	 gain	 access	 to	 network	vulnerabilities	 is	 to	 buy	 them.	 Software	 companies	 and	 developers	 are	 constantly	trying	to	minimize	vulnerabilities	in	their	systems,	and	as	such,	there	has	become	a	market	 for	 finding	 those	 vulnerabilities.	 Companies	 rely	 on	 other	 software	engineers	 to	 find	 these	 exploits	 in	 order	 to	 patch	 them	 as	 quickly	 as	 possibly	
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(Bellovin	41).	The	overt	vulnerabilities	marketplace	 started	 in	2004	when	Mozilla	launched	the	fist	bug-bounty	program.80	The	program	pays	security	researchers	for	vulnerabilities	they	discover.	Many	other	companies	have	sprung	with	similar	bug-bounty	 programs.	 Bellovin	 reveals	 that	 “Many	 legitimate	 security	 research	 firms	have	 made	 finding	 vulnerabilities	 and	 developing	 exploits	 for	 sale	 part	 of	 their	business	model”	and	that	“prices	range	from	$20	to	$250,000	with	exclusive	access	to	 a	 critical	 zero-day	 generally	 the	 most	 expensive”(42).	 A	 zero-day	 is	 a	vulnerability	 discovered	 and	 exploited	 prior	 to	 public	 awareness	 or	 disclosure	 to	the	 vendor.	 Furthermore	 reports	 suggest	 that	 national	 government	 intelligences	agencies	have	become	major	buyers.81	These	companies	include:	Vupen,	Revuln,	and	Vulnerabilities-Lab	and	offer	not	only	working	exploits	and	vulnerabilities,	but	also	offer	special	targeted	exploits	developed	for	additional	fees	(Bellovin	43).		 Lastly,	 vulnerabilities	will	 always	 exist.	 This	 is	 do	 to	 the	 fact	 that	 security	codes	are	write	by	human	beings,	and	as	such	are	prone	to	mistakes.	Bellovin	notes	that	“if	it	has	not	been	programmed	that	way—if	there	is	virtually	any	imperfection	in	 code—a	bug	will	 result”	 (27).	 Further	more	A	National	 Research	 Council	 study	described	the	situation	this	way:		[An]	overwhelming	majority	of	security	vulnerabilities	are	caused	by	“buggy”	code.	 At	 least	 a	 third	 of	 the	 Computer	 Emergency	 Response	 Team	 (CERT)																																																									80	See	Press	Release,	Mozilla	Foundation	Announces	Security	Bug	Bounty	Program	(Aug.	2,	2004),	available	at	https://www.mozilla.org/en-US/press/mozilla-2004-08-02.html.	81	Nicole	Perlroth	&	David	E.	Sanger,	Nations	Buying	as	Hackers	Sell	Flaws	in	Computer	Code,	N.Y.	TIMES,	July	13,	2013,	https://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/14/world/europe/nations-buying-as-hackerssell-computer-flaws.html.	
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advisories	 since	 1997,	 for	 example,	 concern	 inadequately	 checked	 input	leading	to	character	string	overflows	(a	problem	peculiar	to	C	programming	language	handling	of	character	strings).	Moreover,	less	than	15	percent	of	all	CERT	advisories	described	problems	that	 could	have	been	 fixed	or	avoided	by	proper	use	of	cryptography.	82		As	 software	 program	 become	more	 and	more	 complex	 the	 possibilities	 of	 testing	and	 finding	bugs	decreases.	The	ability	 to	produce	an	error-free	 code	 is	“the	Holy	Grail	 of	 systems	 development:	 heavily	 desired	 but	 unattainable.	 Although,	vulnerabilities	are	limited,	and	not	exactly	cost	effective,	they	appear	to	be	the	only	practical	solution	that	doesn’t	pose	a	direct	threat	to	national	security.		There	are	a	number	of	question	that	arise,	however,	using	this	strategy	of	combatting	going	dark	both	 regulatory	 and	 ethically	 such	 as:	Does	 local	 and	 even	 state	 law	 enforcement	agencies	have	the	technical	sophistication	to	develop	and	use	exploits?	 If	not,	how	should	this	be	handled?	And	should	the	FBI	take	larger	role?	Moreover,	Should	law	enforcement	even	be	participating	in	a	market	where	many	of	the	sellers	and	other	buyers	are	 themselves	 criminals?	Does	 the	FBI	have	an	ethical	obligation	 to	share	knowledge	of	vulnerabilities?	In	the	free	market	it	is	common	practice	to	expose	any	known	 vulnerabilities	 (at	 least	 for	 a	 price),	 but	 in	 the	 governments	 best	 interest,	they	would	want	these	vulnerabilities	to	remain	exploitable	for	as	long	as	possible.	In	 doing	 so,	would	 be	 acting	 unethically	 by	 keeping	 vulnerabilities	 disclosed,	 and	would	this	not	only	increase	risk,	but	also	hinder	innovation?	These	questions	are,																																																									82	TRUST	IN	CYBERSPACE	110	(Fred	B.	Schneider	ed.,	1999).		
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although	 beyond	 the	 scope	 of	 this	 paper,	 difficult	 to	 answer.	 It	 seems	 that	 any	solution	 to	 going	 dark	 will	 not	 only	 be	 complex	 and	 multifaceted,	 but	 also	 not	without	some	costs.	
Conclusion	
 		 The	debate	over	privacy	and	security,	in	actuality,	is	a	tradeoff	between	more	security	 and	 less	 security.	 From	 a	 policy	 perspective,	 this	 debate	 raise	 difficult	questions	 regarding	 data	 privacy,	 national	 security,	 economics,	 technology,	 ethics,	and	 mass	 surveillance.	 We	 are	 forced	 to	 consider	 whether	 providing	 access	 to	encrypted	 communications	 to	 help	 prevent	 terrorism	 and	 aid	 in	 criminal	investigation	is	worth	increasing	our	vulnerability	to	cyber	threats.		The	findings	of	this	paper	demonstrate	the	inherent	dangers	involved	in	weakening	encryption,	on	any	 level,	 and	 the	 practical	 consequences	 of	 doing	 so.	 Based	 on	 the	 findings	 of	leading	 security	 technologists,	 I	 conclude	 that	 any	 decryption	 should	 not	 be	considered	as	a	practical	solution	from	both	technological	or	policy	perspective,	as	it	would	position	everyone	at	risk	of	cyber	threats,	while	those	who	wish	to	hide,	will	always	have	other	means	of	doing	so	technologically	speaking.			 At	 the	 same	 time,	 from	 a	 civil	 liberties	 perspective,	 we	 must	 consider	whether	preventing	the	government	from	gaining	access	to	communications	under	circumstances	 strike	 the	 right	 balance	 between	 privacy	 and	 security,	 particularly	when	 terrorists	 and	 criminals	 seek	 to	 use	 encryption	 to	 evade	 government	surveillance.	Ultimately,	mandating	access	to	data	and	communications	is	a	simple	
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solution	for	a	simple	problem,	however	going	dark	is	very	complex,	and	requires	a	multifaceted	and	refined	solutions.	Widespread	encryption	forces	those	listening—whether	it	is	the	NSA,	FBI,	foreign	governments,	criminals	or	terrorist—to	be	much	more	 deliberate.	 As	 for	 the	 going	 dark	metaphor,	 it	 seems	 as	 through	we	 are	 not	entirely	“going	dark”,	and	yet	we	are	not	completely	bright	either.	Both	the	“going	dark”	metaphor	 of	 FBI	 Director	 James	 Comey,	 and	 the	 contrasting	 “golden	 age	 of	surveillance”	metaphor	of	privacy	 law	professor	Peter	Swire	 focus	on	 the	value	of	data	to	law	enforcement,	which	this	paper	did	not	determine	to	be	understated.	The	increased	 availability	 of	 encryption	 technologies	 certainly	 impedes	 government	surveillance	under	certain	circumstances,	and	in	this	sense,	the	government	is	losing	some	 surveillance	 opportunities.	 However,	 our	 stance	 is	 that	 there	 just	 because	there	 are	 those	 who	 use	 encryption	 in	 nefarious	 ways,	 doesn’t	 mean	 we	 should	allow	policy	to	put	us	all	at	risk.	Although	it	comes	at	a	cost,	the	most	constructive	strategy	moving	 forward,	 we	 conclude,	 involves	 the	 combination	 of	 technological	developments	and	lawful	hacking	methods	that	are	likely	to	continue	to	fill	the	gaps	of	going	dark	and	ensure	that	the	government	will	gain	new	opportunities	to	gather	critical	information.							
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